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REVIEW ESSAY
CAPTURING THE FUTURE: EARL WARREN AND
SUPREME COURT HISTORY
James A. Thomsont
THE WARREN COURT: A RETROSPECrIVE. Edited by Bernard Schwartz.tt
New York: Oxford University Press. 1996. Pp. i-x, 406. $45.00.
I. INTRODUCTION
Polarization-not repose-characterizes empirical1  and normative re-
t LL.B. (Hons.) 1971, B.A. 1974, University of Western Australia; LL.M. 1975, SJ.D. 1981, Harvard
University.
tt Chapman Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of Law. Formerly, Edwin D.
Webb Professor of Law, New York University.
1. Consider, for example, debates on the empirical significance of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966) (inadmissibility of confessional statements without prior warning to accused of their constitutional
rights), Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (one vote, one value state legislatures' electoral reapportion-
ment requirement), and Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (state imposed racial segregation
unconstitutional). See, e.g., GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT So-
CLAL CHANGE? (1991) (inconsequential empirical effects of Miranda, Reynolds, and Brown); Louis Michael
Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673 (1992) (Brown and Miranda retreated from, rather than
caused, change). Specifically on Miranda, see Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Reas-
sessment, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 387 (1996) (empirical evidence of Miranda's effect on confessions indicates sig-
nificant harm to law enforcement); Paul G. Cassell, All Benefits, No Costs:. The Grand Illusion of Miranda's
Defenders, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 1084 (1996) (same); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect: Sub-
stantial Benefits and Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 500 (1996) (Miranda's negligible
conviction rate impact); Donald R. Songer, Alternative Approaches to the Study of Judicial Impact: Miranda
in Five State Courts, 16 AM. POL. Q. 425 (1988); Symposium, Dialogue on Miranda, 43 UCLA L. REV. 821
(1996).
Participants in these debates also include Rodney J. Blackman, Returning to Plessy, 75 MARQ. L. REV.
767 (1992) (failure of Supreme Court's desegregation efforts); Robert L. Hayman, Jr. & Nancy Levit, The
Constitutional Ghetto, 1993 Wis. L. REV. 627 (continuing demise of Brown); Michael J. Klarman, Civil
Rights Law: Who Made It and How Much Did It Matter?, 83 GEO. L. 433 (1994) (reviewing MARK V.
TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936-1961
(1994)); Michael J. Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis, 81 J. AM. hST. 81
(1994) (different views of Brown's indirect effects); Symposium, The Supreme Court and Social Change, 17
L. & SOC. INQUIRY 715 (1992); Symposium, Where's the Politics?, 34 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1 (1992);
Steve Bachman, Book Review, 19 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 391 (1991) (reviewing ROSENBERG, su-
pra); Stephen L. Carter, Do Courts Matter?, 90 MicH. L. REV. 1216 (1992) (same); Neal Devins, Judicial
Matters, 80 CAL. L. REV. 1027 (1992) (same); Jonathan Simon, "The Long Walk Home" to Politics, 26 L. &
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sponses3 enticed by one question:4 What did the Warren Court' do?6 Differ-
ences, even radical divergence, can, of course, be constructive and beneficial,
rather than debilitative.7 United States Supreme Court histories8 merely consti-
Soc'Y REV. 923 (1992) (same); Cass R. Sunstein, How Independent is the Court?, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Oct.
22, 1992, at 47; James A. Thomson, Mirages of Certitude: Justices Black and Douglas and Constitutional
Law, 19 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 67, 81-82 (1992) (reviewing HOWARD BALL & PHILLIP J. COOPER, OF POWER
AND RIGHT. HUGO BLACK, WLAM 0. DOUGLAS AND AMERICA'S CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1992))
(judicial review's empirical failure); Mark Tushnet, The Bricoleur at the Center, 60 U. CH. L. REV. 1071,
1087-98 (1993) (reviewing CASS R. SUNSrEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1993)) (ineffective judicial
reform, because of courts' institutional defects, hindering "development of sensible compromises" in racial
discrimination, anti-pornography legislation, and poverty-welfare reform). See also infra notes 121-23, 278.
2. Examples include debates over the legitimacy of judicial review and judicial activism. Perhaps the
preeminent Warren Court antagonist was Professor Bickel. See, e.g., ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF PoLrcs (1962); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, POLI-
TICS AND THE WARREN COURT (1965); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF
PROGRESS (1970); ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 143-50 (1975) (bibliography of
Bickel's publications). On Bickel, see David Adamy, Bickel, Alexander, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 68-69 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992); Robert A. Bur, Alex Bickel's Law
School and Ours, 104 YALE LJ. 1853 (1995); James A. Gardiner, The Ambiguity of Legal Dreams: A
Communitarian Defense of Judicial Restraint, 71 N.C. L. REV. 805, 821-25 (1993) ("Bickel's Rejection of
Constitutionalism"); Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE LJ. 1567
(1985); John Moeller, Alexander M. Bickel: Toward a Theory of Politics, 47 J. POL. 113 (1985); Clyde
Spillenger, Reading the Judicial Canon: Alexander Bickel and the Book of Brandeis, 97 J. AM. HIST. 125
(1992). See also infra notes 15 (Kurland), 96 (Hand), 98 (McCloskey), 99 (Wechsler); text accompanying
infra notes 221-41 (theory and process). See generally Symposium, The Critique of Normativity, 139 U. PA.
L. REV. 801 (1991).
3. See infra notes 10, 12-18, 19-21 (sample of previous discussions of the Warren Court).
4. Other questions also protrude. For example, was there a Warren Court? For different responses see
infra notes 22-24 (postulating Warren, Brennan and Frankfurter Courts). See also text accompanying infra
notes 57-65 (discussing whether the Warren Court existed).
5. For the tradition of Chief Justices' names attaching to Supreme Court eras, see text accompanying
infra notes 56-62.
6. Of course, this question is not exclusive to the 1953-1969 Warren era. It can be asked (and an-
swered) with respect to other eras. See, e.g., James A. Thomson, Not A Trivial Pursuit: Salmon P. Chase and
American Constitutional Law, 23 N. KY. L. REV. 285 (1996) (reviewing JOHN NIVEN, SALMON P. CHASE: A
BIOGRAPHY (1995)) (Chase era, 1864-1873); James A. Thomson, Swimming in the Air: Melville W. Fuller and
the Supreme Court 1888-1910, 27 CUMB. L. REV. 139 (1997) (reviewing JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CHIEF
JUSTIcEsHIP OF MELVILLE W. FULLER, 1888-1910 (1995)) (Fuller era, 1888-1910).
7. See Paul A. Freund, New Vistas in Constitutional Law, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 631, 646 (1964), reprint-
ed in PAUL A. FREUND, ON LAW AND JUSTICE 3, 22 (1968).
[AIIl law resembles art, for the mission of each is to impose a measure of order on the disorder of
experience without stifling the underlying diversity, spontaneity, and disarray. New vistas open in the
art as in law. In neither discipline will the craftsman succeed unless he sees that proportion and bal-
ance are essential, that order and disorder are both virtues when held in a proper tension. The new
vistas give a false light unless there are cross-lights. There are ... no absolutes in law or art except
intelligence.
Id. For an elaboration, via Freund's constitutional law scholarship, see Peter Schotten, Paul Freund's Consti-
tution, 14 PoL. So. REV. 165 (1984) (reviewing FRiEUND, ON LAW AND JUSTICE, supra, and PAUL A.
FREUND, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, ITS BUSINESS, PURPOSES AND PERFORMANCE
(1969)); In Memoriam: Paul A. Freund, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1992). But see Vince Blasi, Book Review, 35
U. CH. L. REV. 388 (1968) (reviewing FREUND, ON LAW AND JUSTICE, supra) (criticizing Freund's moderate
mediating approach).
8. For an eclectic sample, see ERNEST SUTHERLAND BATES, THE STORY OF THE SUPREME COURT
(1963 ed.) (1936); 1-2 HAMPTON L. CARSON, THE HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
WrrH BIOGRAPHIES OF ALL THE CHIEF AND ASSOCIATE JUSTICES (Philadelphia, P.W. Ziegler Co., 1891)
(1991 reprint); CHARLES G. HAINES, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND
POLmcS 1789-1835 (1944); CHARLES GROVE HAINES & FOSTER H. SHERWOOD, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME
COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNmENT.AND POLITICS, 1835-1864 (1957); GUSTAVUS MYERS, HISTORY OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1912); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT
(1993); 1-2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (rev. ed. 1926); WILLIAM
WmcEK, LIBERTY AND LAW: THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN LiFE (1988); 1-9 THE OLIVER WENDELL
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tute a prominent example.9 Leaping into this quagmire is another collection of
essays: ' The Warren Court: A Retrospective." Not unexpectedly, many es-
sayists-Schwartz," Kamisar,13  Simon, 4  Kurland," Dorsen,"6  Hall, 7  and
HOLMES DEVISE: HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1971- ). On the establish-
ment, progress, and objectives of the Holmes Devise History project, see Sanford Levinson, Book Review, 75
VA. L. REv. 1429 (1989) (reviewing G. EDWARD WHrrF, THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE,
1815-1835 (1988)); Eben Moglen, Holmes's Legacy and the New Constitutional History, 108 HARv. L. REV.
2027 (1995) (reviewing OWEN M. FIss, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888-1910 (1993)). See generally Charles G. Haines, Histo-
ries of the Supreme Court of the United States Written from the Federalist Point of View, 4 Sw. POL. SCI. Q.
1 (1923); Mark Tushnet, Writing Supreme Court Histories, 1993 J. Sup. CT. HIST. 11; Mark Tushnet, Toward
a Revisionist History of the Supreme Court, 36 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 319 (1988).
For other countries see, e.g., JAMES F. SNELL & FREDERICK VAUGHAN, THE SUPREME COURT OF
CANADA: HISTORY OF THE INSTITUTION (1985); James A. Thomson, History, Justices and the [Australian]
High Court: An Institutional Perspective, 1 AUST. J. LEG. HIST. 281 (1995) (reviewing GARFIELD BARWICK,
A RADICAL TORY (1995)).
9. Another prominent example is federalism's oscillations between constitutional extremities-preserva-
tion and destruction--o encapsulate differing visions of the relationships between state and national powers.
Justice Brandeis envisaged a "federal system [where] a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose,
serve as a laboratory; and try novel social experiments without risk to the rest of the country." New State Ice
Co. v. Liebman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). However, Justice Cardozo suggested
that the U.S. Constitution "was framed under the dominion of a political philosophy less parochial in
range... upon the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the
long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division" Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S.
511, 523 (1935). For elaboration, see James A. Thomson, State Constitutional Law: American Lessons for
Australian Adventures, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1225, 1247-48 (1985).
10. Previous collections include BICKEL, POLITICS AND THE WARREN COURT, supra note 2; THE WAR-
REN COURT. A CRICAL ANALYSIS (Richard H. Sayler et al. eds., 1969), partially reprinting Symposium, The
Warren Court, 67 MICH. L. REv. 219 (1968); THE SUPREME COURT UNDER EARL WARREN (Leonard W.
Levy ed., 1972); THE WARREN COURT IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE (Mark Tushnet ed.,
1993).
11. THE WARREN COURT. A RETROSPECTIVE (Bernard Schwartz ed., 1996).
12. Professor Bernard Schwartz's publications on the Warren Court include SCHWARTZ, supra note 8, at
263-310; BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CIEF- EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT-A JUDICIAL BIOG-
RAPHY (1983); BERNARD SCHWARTZ & STEPHAN LESHER, INSIDE THE WARREN COURT, 1953-1969 (1983);
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS OF THE WARREN COURT (1985); REASON AND PASSION:
JUSTICE BRENNAN'S ENDURING INFLUENCE (E. Joshua Rosenkranz & Bernard Schwartz eds., 1997); Bernard
Schwartz, More Unpublished Warren Court Opinions, 1986 SuP. CT. REV. 317; Bernard Schwartz, The Judi-
cial Lives of Earl Warren, 15 SUFFOLx U. L. REV. 1 (1981); Bernard Schwartz, "Warren Court"--An Opin-
ion, in THE SUPREME COURT UNDER EARL WARREN, supra note 10, at 48-54; Bernard Schwartz, Hugo Black,
in THE WARREN COURT. A RETROSPECTIVE, supra note 11, at 195-210.
13. Yale Kamisar (Clarence Darrow Distinguished University Professor, University of Michigan Law
School) is "a Warren Court supporter." Yale Kamisar, The "Police Practice" Phases of the Criminal Process
and the Three Phases of the Burger Court, in THE BURGER YEARS: RIGHTS AND WRONGS IN THE SUPREME
COURT 1969-1986, at 143, 144 (Herman Schwartz ed., 1987). His Warren Court publications include Yale
Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the "New" Fifth Amendment and the Old
"Voluntariness" Test, 65 MICH. L. REv. 59 (1966), reprinted in POLICE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS:
ESSAYS IN LAW AND POLICY 41 (1980); Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court (Was It Really So Defense-Mind-
ed?), The Burger Court (Is It Really So Prosecution Oriented?), and Police Investigatory Practices, in THE
BURGER COURT- THE CoUNTER-REVOLUTION THAT WASN'T 62-91, 273-89 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983); Yale
Kamisar, Response: On the "Fruits" of Miranda Violations, Coerced Confessions, and Compelled Testimony,
93 MICH. L. REV. 929 (1995).
14. James F. Simon (Martin Professor, New York Law School). See, e.g., JAMES F. SIMON, INDEPEN-
DENT JOURNEY: THE LIFE OF WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS (1980); James F. Simon, Foreword: The New York Law
School Centennial Conference in Honor of Justice John Marshall Harlan, 36 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1 (1991);
James F. Simon, John Marshall Harlan, in 11 COLLIER'S ENCYCLOPEDIA 654 (1988).
15. Philip B. Kurland (Late William R. Kenan Distinguished Service Professor Emeritus, University of
Chicago Law School), who clerked for Frankfurter, see James B. O'Hara, Introduction, in TE WARREN
COURT. A REmROSPECTVE, supra note 11, at 5, was "a stalwart partisan of Frankfurter's," Philip B. Kurland,
Felix Frankfurter, in THE WARREN COURT. A RETROSPECrIVE, supra note 11, at 225. His Warren Court
publications include PHILIP B. KURLAND, POLITICS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT (1970);
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Lewis'--contributing to this Retrospective are already enmeshed in Warren
Philip B. Kurland, Earl Warren, "The Warren Court," and The Warren Myths, in THE WARREN COURT. A
CRITICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 10, at 162-67, reprinted from 67 MICH. L. REV. 353 (1968); Philip B.
Kurland, The Court Should Decide Less and Explain More, in THE SUPREME COURT UNDER EARL WARREN,
supra note 10, at 228-38; Philip B. Kurland, Toward a Political Supreme Court, 37 U. CiiL L. REV. 19
(1969); Philip B. Kurland, Equal Educational Opportunity: The Limits of Constitutional Jurisprudence Unde-
fined, 35 U. CL. L. REV. 583 (1968); Philip B. Kurland, Felix Frankfurter, 51 VA. L. REV. 562 (1965); Phil-
ip B. Kurland, Foreword: "Equal in Origin and Equal in Title to the Legislative and Executive Branches of
the Government," 78 HARV. L. REV. 143 (1964); Philip B. Kurland, The Regents' Prayer Case: "Full of
Sound and Fury, Signifying... " 1962 SuP. CT. REV. 1; Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the
Supreme Court, 29 U. Cr. L. REV. 1 (1961), reprinted as PHHP B. KURLAND, RELIGION AND THE LAW: OF
CHURCH AND STATE AND THE SUPREME COURT (rev. ed. 1962); Philip B. Kurland, The Mersky Case and the
Criminal Appeals Act: A Suggestion for Amendment of the Statute, 28 U. C. L. REV. 419 (1961); Philip B.
Kurland, The Supreme Court and the Attrition of State Power, 10 STAN. L. REV. 274 (1958); Philip B.
Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdiction of State
Courts-From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. Ci-H. L. REV. 569 (1958); Philip B. Kurland, "Neuro":
A Biography of Felix Frankfurter, 1981 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1167 (reviewing H.N. HIRSCH, THE ENIGMA
OF FELIX FRANKFURTER (1981)); Philip B. Kurland, Self Portrait of a Jurist-Without Warts, 87 YALE LJ. 225
(1977) (reviewing EARL WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN (1977)); Philip B. Kurland, The Chief
Justice and the School Segregation Cases, 27 U. CHi. L. REV. 170 (1959) (reviewing THE PUBLIC PAPERS OF
CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN (Henry M. Christman ed., 1959)); Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court and
Its Literate Critics, 64 YALE REV. 596 (1958) (reviewing WALTER F. BERNS, FREEDOM, VIRTUE, AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT (1957)).
16. Norman Dorsen (Stokes Professor, New York University Law School), who clerked for Justice
Harlan, see Tinsley E. Yarbrough, Mr. Justice Harlan: Reflections of a Biographer, 36 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
223, 224 (1991); O'Hara, supra note 15, at 5, has published on the Warren Court, for example, Norman
Dorsen, The Second Mr. Justice Harlan: A Constitutional Conservative, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 249 (1969); Nor-
man Dorsen, John Marshall Harlan and the Warren Court, 1991 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 50, reprinted in THE
WARREN COURT IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 10, at 109-22, 186-91; Norman
Dorsen, John Marshall Harlan, Civil Liberties, and the Warren Court, 36 N.Y.L. SH. L. REV. 81 (1991);
Norman Dorsen, Introduction: Douglas and Civil Liberties, in "HE SHALL NOT PASS THIS WAY AGAIN": THE
LEGACY OF JUSTICE WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS 65-67 (Stephen L. Wasby ed., 1990); Norman Dorsen, John Mar.
shall Harlan II, in THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: A BIOGRAPHICAL DICTIONARY 215-23 (Melvin 1. Urofsky
ed., 1994); Norman Dorsen, Book Review, 34 J. LEGAL EDUC. 543 (1984) (reviewing G. EDWARD WHITE,
EARL WARREN: A PUBLIC LiE (1982)); Norman Dorsen, Book Review, 95 HAIv. L. REV. 367 (1981) (re-
viewing HIRSCH, supra note 15).
17. Kermit L Hall (Professor of History and Law, Ohio State University). His Warren Court publications
include KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 309-29 (1989); Kermit L. Hall,
Justice Brennan and Cultural History: New York Times v. Sullivan and Its Times, 27 CAL. W. L. REV. 339
(1991).
18. Anthony Lewis (columnist, the New York Times), who "reported [from 1957 to 1964] on the Warren
Court for the New York Times," Anthony Lewis, The Legacy of the Warren Court, in THE WARREN COURT. A
RETROSPECnVE, supra note 11, at 398, has published ANTHONY LEWIS, CLARENCE EARL GIDEON AND TIE
SUPREME COURT (1972); ANTHONY LEwIS, MAKE No LAW: THE Suwmv CASE AND THE FIRST AMEND-
mcr (1991) (history, including intra-mural Court papers, and discussions of New York Times v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254 (1964)); Anthony Lewis, Earl Warren, in 4 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT.
THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 1373-1400 (Leon Friedman & Fred L. Israel eds., rev. ed. 1997); Antho-
ny Lewis, Earl Warren, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 2019-23 (Leonard Levy et al.
eds., 1986); Anthony Lewis, New York Times v. Sullivan Reconsidered: Time to Return to "The Central
Meaning of the First Amendment," 83 COLUM. L. REV. 603 (1983), reprinted in LAW AND LIBERALISM IN
THE 1980s: THE RUBIN LECTURES AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY 44-68 (Vincent Blasi ed., 1991); Anthony Lew-
is, The Press: Free But Not Exceptional, in REASON AND PASSION, supra note 12, at 53-63; Anthony Lewis,
Keynote Address, in Conference on the 30th Anniversary of the United States Supreme Court's Decision in
Gideon v. Wainwright: Gideon and the Public Service Role of Lawyers in Advancing Equal Justice, 43 AM.
U. L. REV. 1, 15 (1993); Anthony Lewis, Earl Warren, in THE WARREN COURT: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS,
supra note 10, at 1-31; Anthony Lewis, Historic Change in the Supreme Court, in THE SUPREME COURT
UNDER EARL WARREN, supra note 10, at 73-81; id. at 114-19 ("What Qualities for the Court"); id. at 120-27
("An Appreciation of Justice Frankfurter"); id. at 128-36 ("Justice Black at 75: Still the Dissenter"); id. at
151-63 ("A Man Born to Act, Not to Muse"); id. at 164-83; Anthony Lewis, Adventures in Opinion, N.Y.
TIMES BOOK REV., Sept. 24, 1967, at 3 (reviewing LEo KATCHER, EARL WARREN: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY
(1967)); Anthony Lewis, Revolutionary Justice, N.Y. TIES BOOK REV., July 4, 1982, at 1 (reviewing WHITE,
supra note 16); Anthony Lewis, The Arguments Mattered Most, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., Dec. 29, 1985, at 20
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Court controversies. Others-Urofsky,"9 Tushnet, ° and White2t-might also
have been included. Consequently, far from resolving disputes or engendering
compromise, this potpourri invigorates those imbroglios. Even from the initial
premise-The Warren Court-an illustration protrudes: Was the Supreme Court
during the 1953-1969 era the Warren Court,' the Brennan Court,' or, per-
haps, the Frankfurter Court?24
(reviewing SCHWARTZ, UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS, supra note 12).
19. Professor Melvin I. Urofsky (Professor of History, Virginia Commonwealth University). Urofsky's
Warren Court publications include Melvin I. Urofsky, Warren, Earl, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE
SUPREME COURT, supra note 2, at 912-16; MELVIN I. UROFSKY, THE CONTINUITY OF CHANGE: THE SUPREME
COURT AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES 1953-1986 (1991); MELVIN .UROFSKY, FELIX FRANKFURTER: JUDICIAL
RESTRAINT AND INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES (1991); THE DOUGLAS LETTERS: SELECTIONS FROM THE PRIVATE PA-
PERS OF JUSTICE WiIAM 0. DOUGLAS (Melvin L Urofsky ed., 1987); MELVIN I. UROFSKY, A MARCH OF
LIBERTY: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 766-853 (1988); Melvin 1. Urofsky, Getting
the Job Done: William 0. Douglas and Collegiality in the Supreme Court, in "HE SHALL NOT PASS THIS
WAY AGAIN", supra note 16, at 33-49; Melvin I. Urofsky, William 0. Douglas as Common Law Judge, in
THE WARREN COURT IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 10, at 64-85, 177-83; Melvin
I. Urofsky, William 0. Douglas as a Common Law Judge, 41 DUKE LJ. 133 (1991); Melvin L Urofsky, Wil-
liam 0. Douglas and His Clerks, 3 WEST. LEGAL HIST. 133 (1990); Melvin I. Urofsky, Conflict Among the
Brethren: Felix Frankfurter, William 0. Douglas and the Clash of Personalities and Philosophies on the
United States Supreme Court, 1988 DUKE LJ. 71; Melvin I. Urofsky, William 0. Douglas, Common Law
Judge, CONST., Fall 1992, at 48; Melvin I. Urofsky, "Dear Teacher": The Correspondence of William 0.
Douglas and Thomas Reed Powell, 7 L. & HIST. REV. 331 (1989).
20. Mark V. Tushnet (Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center). Tushnet's Warren Court
publications include TusHNEr, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW, supra note 1; Mark Tushnet, The Warren Court
as History: An Interpretation, in THE WARREN COURT IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE, supra
note 10, at 1-34, 171-73; Mark V. Tushnet & Katya Lezin, What Really Happened in Brown v. Board of
Education, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1867 (1991); Mark Tushnet, Themes in Warren Court Biographies, 70 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 748 (1995).
21. G. Edward White (John B. Minor Professor of Law and Sullivan & Cromwell Professor of Law and
History, University of Virginia). White's Warren Court publications include WHrrF, supra note 16; G. ED-
WARD WHITE, THE AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION: PROFILES OF LEADING AMERICAN JUDGES 317-420 (ex-
pand. ed., 1988) (essays on Frankfurter, Black, Warren, Harlan, and Douglas); G. Edward White, Warren
Court, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, supra note 18, at 2023-31; G. Edward White,
Earl Warren's Influence on the Warren Court, in THE WARREN COURT IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PER-
SPECTIVE, supra note 10, at 37-50, 173-74; G. Edward White, Researching Oral History Materials: The Case
of Earl Warren, 75 L. LIBR. J. 355 (1982); G. Edward White, Earl Warren as Jurist, 67 VA. L. REV. 461
(1981).
22. For an affirmative response, see text accompanying infra notes 63-65. See also Tushnet, The Warren
Court as History, supra note 20, at 2, 33 (analysis and conclusion that "there was a Warren Court, and not a
Brennan Court"); William J. Brennan, Jr., Chief Justice Warren, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1974) ("refer[ing] to
the Supreme Court during [Earl Warren's] years as the 'Warren Court' . . . does not... signify that [Warren]
dominated the shaping of the Court's decisions.... [Iowever, the 'Warren Court' is highly appropriate as
recognition of [Warren's] effective leadership."); William J. Brennan, Jr., A Personal Remembrance, in THM
WARREN COURT. A RErRosPEcIE, supra note 11, at 8, 10 (same); Bernard Schwartz, Earl Warren, in THE
WARREN COURTr A RETROSPECrnvE, supra note 11, at 256, 260-61 ("It Was the Warren Court"). But see id.
at 260 (Justice Black changed the Justices' farewell letter to Warren from "the Warren Court" to "the Court
over which [Warren had] presided.) (footnote omitted).
23. For an affirmative response, see, for example, Dennis J. Hutchinson, Hail to the Chief: Earl Warren
and the Supreme Court, 81 MICH. L. REV. 922, 923, 928-30 (1983) (reviewing WHITE, supra note 16, and
SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF, supra note 12) (concluding that "it was 'the Brennan Court'" because Brennan
"was Warren's intellectual chief-of-staff" and "clearly... the single most important justice of the period");
Robert C. Post, Justice William J. Brennan and the Warren Court, 8 CONST. COMMENTARY 11 (1991), re-
printed in THE WARREN COURT IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECIVE, supra note 10, at 123 (arguing
that the Warren era, in reality, was the Brennan era); James G. Exum, Jr., & Louis D. Bilionis, The Warren
Court and State Constitutional Law, in THE WARREN COURT: A RETROSPECTVE, supra note 11, at 313, 316
("Justice William J. Brennan-for many, the personification of the jurisprudential revolution perfected by the
Warren Court') (footnote omitted). See also infra note 255 (references).
24. For the suggestion of "a revisionist rehabilitation of [Justice Felix] Frankfurter," see text accompany-
ing infra note 266. See also Philip B. Kurland, Felix Frankfurter, supra note 15, at 225 (partially quoted in
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Within constitutional law's domain,' exposing these conundrums is usu-
ally achieved by doctrinal analysis,'s biographical narratives,' assessment of
the impact already exerted,s and predicting future influence." The Warren
Court: A Retrospective adheres to this methodology." Previous appraisals of
the Warren Court utilize additional approaches: jurimetrics," economic inter-
pretations,32 empirical research33 and hermeneutic principles. 4 As a result,
text accompanying infra note 265) (suggesting that Frankfurter was "one of the great" Supreme Court Justic-
es). But see Norman Dorsen, John Marshall Harlan, in THE WARREN COURT: A RETROsPECTIvE, supra note
11, at 248 (arguing that "Frankfurter's star has dimmed considerably"); Schwartz, supra note 22, at 258 (con-
cluding that "Frankfurter's judicial career remained essentially a lost opportunity"). See generally infra notes
233, 259 (literature on Frankfurter).
25. What of the 1953-1969 Supreme Court's non-constitutional work? See, e.g., WHrrE, supra note 16,
at 279-302 ("Warren [as] the Economic Theorist: Labor and Antitrust"); Alex Kozinski, Spook of Earl: The
Spirit and Spector of the Warren Court, in THE WARREN COURT: A RETROSPECTIVE, supra note 11, at 383
('The [Warren] Court did take a variety of cases involving labor law and antitrust, but the results were over-
whelmingly against business and property interests.') (footnote omitted). See also Richard Neely, The Warren
Court and the Welcome Stranger Rule, in THE WARREN COURT. A RETROSPECTIVE, supra note 11, at 188-89
(suggesting that the Warren Court should have federalized state product liability law); Thomson, Mirages of
Certitude, supra note 1, at 72 n.29 (Black and Douglas' non-constitutional law opinions).
26. See, e.g., supra notes 2, 10-21 and infra notes 92-94, 96, 98-99 (references).
27. See, e.g., infra notes 12, 14-21,246-59 (biographical literature). See also Tushnet, Themes in Warren
Court Biographies, supra note 20.
28. For general assessments, see, for example, THE IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS: EMPIRICAL
STUDIES (Theodore L. Becker & Malcolm M. Feeley eds., 2d ed. 1973); PHILIP COOPER & HOWARD BALL,
TH UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT. FROM THE INSIDE OUT 334-53 (1996); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD
J. SPAETH, THE SuPREME COURT AND THE ATtrUDINAL MODEL 333-55 (1993) ("The impact of judicial deci-
sions"); STEPHEN L. WASBY, THE IMPACT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT. SOME PERSPECTIVES
(1970); STEPHEN L. WAsBY, RACE RELATIONS LITIGATION IN AN AGE OF COMPLEXrrY 26-45, 347-51 (1997)
("The Supreme Court's Impact on Litigation"). See also supra note 1 (empirical impact studies on Warren
Court decisions).
29. See, e.g., Nell K. Komesar, Back to the Future-An Institutional View of Making and Interpreting
Constitutions, 81 Nw. U. L. REV. 191 (1987) (Constitution's framers intended to delegate most decisions to
future decisionmakers); Richard Davies Parker, The Past of Constitutional Theory -And Its Future, 42 OHIO
ST. LJ. 223 (1981); Tushnet, The Warren Court as History, supra note 20, at 33 ("Perhaps more interesting
for the future, did the Warren Court ever end?"). Indeed, Professor Strossen is "especially eager to draw les-
sons that not only shed light on where we have been, but that also point the way toward where we can and
should go.... Mhat's the most promising aspect of [THE WARREN COURT: A RETROSPECTIVE, supra note
11]: It should serve not only as a retrospective celebration of a great Court, but also as a source of guidance
and inspiration for future work...." Nadine Strossen, Freedom of Speech in the Warren Court, in THE
WARREN COURT. A RETROSPECTIVE, supra note 11, at 68, 74. See also Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v.
Ohio and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure
Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1366 (1983) (expressing the "hope... that by analyzing the development
of the [exclusionary] rule, we can best approach the question of what the law should be in the future').
30. See generally THE WARREN COURT. A RETROSPECTIVE, supra note 11.
31. See, e.g., GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND REVISITED: PSYCHOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF SU-
PREME COURT ANALYSIS (1974); GLENDON SCHUBERT, HuMAN JURISPRUDENCE: PUBLIC LAW AS POLITICAL
SCIENCE (1975); Russell W. Galloway, Jr., The Early Years of the Warren Court: Emergence of Judicial
Liberalism (1953-1957), 18 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 609 (1978); Russell W. Galloway, Jr., The Second Period
of the Warren Court: The Liberal Trend Abates (1957-1961), 19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 947 (1979); Russell
W. Galloway, Jr., The Third Period of the Warren Court: Liberal Dominance (1962-1969), 20 SANTA CLARA
L. REV. 773 (1980).
32. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Was New York Times v. Sullivan Wrong?, 53 U. CH. L. REV. 782
(1986); (Sullivan's doctrinal decisions, for example liability rules, rest on unexplored empirical issues such as
costs). See generally Daniel A. Farber, Free Speech Without Romance: Public Choice and the First Amend-
ment, 105 HARv. L. REv. 554 (1991) (economics of First Amendment); Frank I. MicheIman, A Comment on
Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CI. L. REV. 307 (1979) (difficulty of tracing empirical
impact of legal rules to assist economic analysis). See generally Morton J. Horwitz, Law and Economics:
Science or Politics?, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905 (1980) (outlining history of law-and-economics).
33. See supra note 1. See also infra note 283 (empirical pragmatism).
34. Cf. Eben Moglen, Jewishness and the American Constitutional Tradition: The Cases of Brandeis and
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encrusted onto the U.S. Supreme Court Reports, 5 is a plethora of scholar-
ship?6
II. A WARREN COURT?
Even to a deceptively "simple question"37-- did the Warren Court ex-
ist?3s-"[a] good number of revisionist scholars apparently have doubts" about
proclaiming or endorsing an affirmative response."' Assume, albeit momentari-
ly, that there was a Warren Court: who were its members? Ought all of the
"seventeen'" men4' who sat on the Supreme Court, during Chief Justice
Warren's tenure, be included? If so, that would provide one answer--"from
1953 to 1969"---to a more complex question: when did the Warren Court
exist? However, other responses have also been postulated. For example, "con-
ventional wisdom"43 erects a dichotomy: "The First Warren Court '" from
Frankfurter, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 959 (1989) (reviewing ROBERT A. BURT, TWO JEWISH JUSTICES: OUTCASTS
IN THE PROMIsED LAND (1988)) (suggesting that in the "genre of literary criticism.., historical data are
treated metaphorically and [that] the test for establishing the quality of works in this genre is whether the
questions raised are interesting").
35. For Earl Warren's 1963-1969 tenure, see volumes 346 to 399 of United States Reports. See also
SCHWARTZ, THE UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS, supra note 12; SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF, supra note 12 (draft
opinions and internal Court papers); Schwartz, More Unpublished Warren Court Opinions, supra note 12.
36. See, e.g., supra notes 2, 10, 11 and infra notes 92-99. See also HOWARD BALL, THE WARREN
COURT'S CONCEPTIONS OF DEMOCRACY: AN EVALUATION OF THE SUPREME COURT'S APPORTIONMENT OPIN-
IONS (1971); ARCIEBALD Cox, THE WARREN COURT. CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION AS AN INSTRUMENT OF
REFORM (1968); ARCHIBALD COX, THE COURT AND THE CONSTIUrION 177-321 (1987); DAVID P. CURRIE,
THE CONSTTmON IN THE SUPREME COURT. THE SECOND CENTURY 1888-1986, at 375-459 (1990); JOHN P.
FRANK, THE WARREN COURT (1964); RONALD KAHN, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY,
1953-1993, at 30-104 (1994); LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM 1-131 (1996);
ALPHEUS T. MASON, THE SUPREME COURT FROM TAFT TO BURGER 234-82 (3d ed. rev. & enlarged, 1979);
ROBERT G. MCCLOSKY, THE MODERN SUPREME COURT 127-259 (1972) ("The Early Warren Court"); id. at
261-366 ("Te Latter Warren Court"); HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE WARREN COURT. CASES AND COMMENTARY
(1966); CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW: FROM CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETA-
TION TO JUDGE-MADE LAW 258-91 (rev. ed. 1994); Supreme Court History Project: The Warren Court 1953-
1957, 18 SANrA CLARA L. REV. 609 (1978); Supreme Court History Project: The Warren Court 1957-1961,
19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 947 (1979); Supreme Court History Project: The Warren Court 1962-1969, 20
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 773 (1980).
37. Kermit L. Hall, The Warren Court in Historical Perspective, in THE WARREN COURT. A RETRO-
SPECTnVE, supra note 11, at 295, reprinting Kermit L. Hall, The Warren Court: Yesterday, Today, and Tomor-
row, 28 IND. L. REV. 309 (1995).
38. Compare id. ("whether the Warren Court existed"). See also Moglen, supra note 34, at 976 (assert-
ing that "'[t]he Warren Court,' [was] a psychological entity without existence").
39. Hall, supra note 37, at 295. Although "[slome scholars have ... questioned the proposition that
there was" a Warren Court, Professor Hall concludes that "there was without doubt a Warren Court, an iden-
tifiable judicial entity ... which was distinctive in the overall history of the Supreme Court." Id. at 295, 299.
40. Kurland, supra note 24, at 225. The seventeen are: Warren (1953-69); Black (1937-71); Reed (1938-
57); Frankfurter (1939-62); Douglas (1939-75); Jackson (1941-54); Burton (1945-58); Clark (1949-56);
Minton (1949-56); Harlan (1955-71); Brennan (1956-90); Whittaker (1957-62); Stewart (1958-81); White
(1962-92); Goldberg (1962-69); Marshall (1967-91). CRRIE, supra note 36, at 376; Julius L. Chambers, Race
and Equality: The Still Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, in THE WARREN COURT. A RETROSPECTIVE,
supra note 11, at 48 n.7.
41. The first female justice-Sandra Day O'Connor-was appointed on Sept. 26, 1981. THE SUPREME
COURT JUSTICES: ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHIES, 1789-1993, at 534 (Clare Cushman ed., 1993).
42. "[The Warren Court] means the United States Supreme Court over which Earl Warren presided from
1953 to 1969." Kurland, supra note 24, at 225.
43. Hall, supra note 37, at 298. See also CURRIE, supra note 36, at 375, 415 (two phases, pre and post
1962); Tushnet, The Warren Court as History, supra note 20, at 7 (same). But see Yale Kamisar, The Warren
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October 5, 1953'5 to August 28, 19624 and "The Real Warren Court"'47 from
October 1, 19624' to June 23, 1969.' 9 Further variants emerge in suggestions
which ante-date either the commencement50 or end5' of the latter characteriza-
tion. Swirling within and influencing this chronological debate are substantive
Court and Criminal Justice, in THE WARRm COURT. A RETROSPECTIVE, supra note 11, at 116-17, reprinting
Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal Justice: A Quarter-Century Retrospective, 31 TULSA LJ. 1, 2-
4 (1995) (three phases, 1953-1962, 1962-1966 or 1967, and then until 1969 because "in the main, the [crimi-
nal procedure] revolution ended a couple of years before Earl Warren stepped down as Chief Justice") (em-
phasis in 6riginal) (footnote omitted).
44. CURRiE, supra note 36, at 377. See also Hall, supra note 37, at 298 (describing "the first" Warren
Court).
45. Earl Warren took the judicial oath of office on Oct. 5, 1953, and, as this was a recess appointment,
Senate confirmation occurred on March 11, 1954. See THE SuPREM COURT JUSTICES, supra note 41, at 531;
THE OXFORD COMPANION, supra note 19, at 970; WHrrE, supra note 16, at 129-55 ("Governing: National
Politics and the Supreme Court Nomination'); John P. Frank & Julie Zatz, The Appointment of Earl Warren
as Chief Justice of the United States, 23 AIz. ST. LJ. 725 (1991). But note WARREN, supra note 15, at 276
("the fourth day of October, 1953"); id. at 278-79 (Warren's description of taking the "Constitutional Oath"
and "Judicial Oath").
46. Justice Felix Frankfurter retired on Aug. 28, 1962. See THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note
41, at 534; THE OXFORD COMPANION, supra note 19, at 969; UROFSKY, FEX FRANKFURTER, supra note 19,
at 184.
47. CURRa, supra note 44, at 415. See also Hall, supra note 37, at 298 (describing the post "1962
term ... Warren Court... as [a] powerful institution of liberal change").
48. Arthur J. Goldberg took the judicial oath of office on Oct. 1, 1962. See THE SUPREME COURT JUS-
TCES, supra note 41, at 534; TEE OXFORD COMPANION, supra note 19, at 970; Susan H. Hernman, Arthur
Joseph Goldberg, in THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 16, at 193. See also CURRIE, supra note 44,
at 375 ("decisive event"), 415 ("dramatic shift"); Tushnet, The Warren Court as History, supra note 20, at 7
(precise date for dramatic change). See generally DAvaD STEBENNE, ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG: NEW DEAL LiB-
RAL (1996).
49. Chief Justice Warren retired on June 23, 1969. See THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 41, at
531; THE OXFORD COMPANION, supra note 19, at 970; WirrE, supra note 16, at 305-13.
50. For example, extending the "real" Warren Court back to Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954). See Kurland, supra note 24, at 225-26. For suggestions that the start of this "real" court was some-
what later-1956 or 1961-but still prior to 1962, see Kamisar, supra note 43, at 146 n.3 (referring to Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)).
51. "In its final years [1966 or 1967], the Warren Court was not the same court [as it had been since
1962]. The Chief Justice's majority opinion in Terry v. Ohio [392 U.S. 1 (1968)] ... is a dramatic demonstra-
tion of the Warren Court's change in tone and attitude." Kamisar, supra note 43, at 116-17. Does this suggest
that the Warren Court instituted a "counterrevolution in criminal procedure"? Id. at 117 (footnote omitted).
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constitutional concerns-the Warren Court's revolution 52-- for example, in ra-
cial discrimination, 3 electoral reapportionment, 4 and criminal procedure
Of course, "naming Supreme Court epochs after Chief Justices is problem-
atic at best and misleading at worst."56 Reasons are obvious. First, justices'
tenures overlap. Consequently, vis-a-vis a Chief Justice's tenure, there can be
prior and/or post Supreme Court service.Y Secondly, Chief Justices may not be
52. For "revolution" terminology, see, for example, Kamisar, supra note 43, at 116 ("Warren Court's
'revolution' in American criminal procedure"); Bernard Schwartz, Preface, in THE WARREN COURT: A RET-
ROSPECIwF, supra note 11, at v ("the most profound and pervasive revolution") (quoting Justice Fortas);
O'Hara, supra note 15, at 3 ("almost revolutionary significance"); Chambers, supra note 40, at 21 ("revolu-
tionized"); Schwartz, supra note 22, at 273 ("transformation"); Hall, supra note 37, at 302 ("Warren Court's
revolution in public law"); id. at 304 ("Warren Court revolution was... substantive [and] procedural'); An-
thony Lewis, The Legacy of the Warren Court, in THE WARREN COURT:. A RETROSPECrIVE, supra note 11, at
398 ("Court... acted like a second [American] constitutional convention"). See also Joseph L. Hoffman &
William J. Stuntz, Habeas After the Revolution, 1993 SUP. Cr. REv. 65, 66-67, 77-80 (recounting and analyz-
ing 1960s revolution and complete transformation into federal constitutional law of state criminal law and
procedure); Morton J. Horwitz, The Warren Court and the Pursuit of Justice, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 5
(1993) (discussing Warren Court's "constitutional revolution"). For the view that the Warren Court (in race,
criminal law, free speech, religion, and re-apportionment cases) merely "built upon and expanded" precedents,
see Hall, supra note 37, at 299, 301; Chambers, supra note 40, at 28 ("not... create law from whole cloth");
Lewis, supra, at 400 (Brown "was not a sudden break with precedent'). For pre-Warren Court race cases, see,
for example, RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JusTCF: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATON AND
BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 3-357 (1975); TUSHNEr, MAKING CiviL RIGHTS LAW, supra
note 20, at 1-149. For pre-Warren Court free speech and press cases, see, for example, FRED W. FRIENDLY,
MINNESOTA RAG: THE DRAMATIC STORY OF THE LANDMARK CASE THAT GAVE NEW MEANING TO FREEDOM
OF THE PRESS (1981) (discussing Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (Minnesota state imposing uncon-
stitutional prior restraint on newspaper's publication)); HARRY KALVEN JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: FREEDOM
OF SPEECH IN AMERICA (1988); RICHARD POLENBERG, FIGHTING FArHs: THE ABRAMs CASE, THE SPREmE
COURT, AND FREE SPEECH (1987) (discussing Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (sustaining con-
victions under the Espionage Act)); David M. Rabban, Free Speech in Progressive Social Thought, 74 TEx.
L. REV. 951 (1996); David M. Rabban, The IWW Free Speech Rights and Popular Conceptions of Free Ex-
pression Before World War 1, 80 VA. L. REv. 1055 (1994); David M. Rabban, The Free Speech League, the
ACLU, and Changing Conceptions of Free Speech in American History, 37 STAN. L. REv. 47 (1992); David
M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. CHL L. REv. 1205 (1983); David
M. Rabbin, The First Amendment in its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE LJ. 514 (1981). For pre-Warren Court
criminal law cases, see, for example, RICHARD C. CORTNER, A MOB INTENT ON DEATH: THE NAACP AND
THE ARKANSAS RIOT CASES (1988) (analysis and narrative of Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923);
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 322 (1943) (admissibility of confessions in federal courts); Upshaw v.
United States, 335 U.S. 410 (1948) (same); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957)). See also infra
notes 68 (counter-revolution thesis), 170 (revolution).
53. See infra note 86 (literature on Brown).
54. See, e.g., GORDON E. BAKER, THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION: REPRESENTATION, POLmCAL
POWER, AND Tim SUPREME COURT (1966); BALL, supra note 36; RICHARD C. CORTNER, Tm APPORTION-
MENT CASES (1970) (analysis and narrative of Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), and Reynolds v. Sims, 377
U.S. 533 (1964)); ROBERT G. DIXON, JR., DEMOCRATIC REPREsENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND
POLITICS (1968); GENE GRAHAM, ONE MAN, ONE VOTE: BAKER V. CARR AND THE AMERICAN LEVELLERS
(1972); ROYCE HANSON, THE POLITICAL THICKE:. REAPPORTIONMENT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY
(1966); ROBERT B. McKAY, REAPPORTIONMENr:. THE LAW AND POLITICs OF EQUAL REPRESENTATION (Si-
mon & Schuster, 1970) (1965); Carl A. Auerbach, The Reapportionment Cases: One Person, One Vote-One
Vote, One Value, 1964 SUP. Cr. REV. 1; Benjamin R. Jacewicz, The Relationship of Judicial Politics and
Constitutional History in the Warren Court's Apportionment Revolution, 9 J.L. & POL. 435 (1993); Robert G.
McCloskey, Foreword: The Reapportionment Case, 76 HARv. L. REV. 54 (1962). For subsequent develop-
ments, see, for example, Pamela S. Karlan, All Over the Mpp: The Supreme Court's Voting Rights Trilogy,
1993 SUP. Cr. REV. 245 (discussing Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 25 (1993); Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S.
146 (1993); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993)).
55. See, e.g., CRAIG BRADLEY, TiE FAILURE OF THE CRIMINAL PROCEDURE REVOLUTION (1993); FRED
P. GRAHAM, THE DUE PROCESS REVOLuTON: THE WARREN COURT'S IMPACt ON CRIMI AL LAW (rep. 1978)
(1970 title The Self Inflicted Wound); Kamisar, supra note 43.
56. Hall, supra note 37, at 295. See generally Thomson, Swimming in the Air, supra note 6, at 142-43
n.17 (literature on office of Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court).
57. See Hall, supra note 37, at 295.
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the Court's dominant or major figure intellectually,58 institutionally or adminis-
tratively, 9 or socially.' Apart from personal abilities or characteristics, that
may be a consequence of the Chief Justice's length-too long or too short-of
tenure.6 Thirdly, an individual justice or group of justices may provide the
most effective influence on results and doctrines during a Chief Justice's ten-
ure.62 Assessing Earl Warren's attributes-positive and negative-as Chief Jus-
tice and comparing them with justices who served before, after, and with him,
The Warren Court seemingly63 advances a pre-ordained' conclusion: Warren
"was the most important presence on the [Supreme] Court from 1953 to 1969;
that is why it is fair to call the [Supreme] Court of this period after him."
There has often been considerable overlap in the Associate Justices on the Court .... More than
seventy percent of all Associate Justices ... outlast the Chief Justice serving at the time of their
appointment. That was certainly the case with the Warren Court; of the eight Associates appointed
during Warren's term, only... Charles Whittaker, left before Warren's retirement.
Id. See also supra note 40 (dates of judicial tenure).
58. Compare, for example, the intellectual dominance of Chief Justices Marshall and Hughes with the
subordinate intellectual position of Vinson and Warren. For details, see, for example, LEONARD BAKER, JOHN
MARSHALL: A LIFE IN LAw (1974); CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND
THE RULE OF LAW (1996); HERBERT A. JOHNSON, THE CHIEF JUSTCESHIp OF JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-1835
(1997); JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFENDER OF A NATION (1996); SAMiUEL HENDEL,
CHARLES EVANS HUGHES AND THE SUPREME COURT (1950); 1-2 MERLO J. PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES
(1951); Paul A. Freund, Charles Evans Hughes as ChiefJustice, 81 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1967); Paul A. Freund,
Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, 69 N.Y. HIST. 144 (1988), reprinted in 1988 Sup. CT. HIST Soc'Y Y.B.
70; MELvIN L URoFSKY, DIVSION AND DISCORD: THE SUPREME COURT UNDER STONE AND VINSON, 1941-
1953 (1997); James A. Thomson, Frederick Moore Vinson, in THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 16,
at 489-92; supra note 23 (Brennan was the Warren Court intellectual chief-of-staff). For more ambivalence,
see Thomson, Not a Trivial Pursuit, supra note 30, at 318, 323 (Chief Justice Chase).
59. Compare, for example, Hughes and Taft with Stone. See, e.g., ROBERT J. STEAMER, CHIEF JUSTICE:
LEADERSHIP AND THE SUPREME COURT 265-66 (1986) (Stone "had the good fortune to be able to observe two
models of court management first-hand, Taft for five years and Hughes for ten, but... he was incapable of
emulating either"); Peter Fish, William Howard Taft and Charles Evans Hughes: Conservative Politicians as
Chief Judicial Reformers, 1975 SUP. Cr. REV. 123; Felix Frankfurter, "The Administrative Side" of Chief
Justice Hughes, 63 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1949); Edwin McElwain, The Business of the Supreme Court as Con-
ducted by Chief Justice Hughes, 63 HARV. L. REV. 5 (1949).
60. See, e.g., ELY, supra note 6, at 30 ("Fuller was a masterful social leader of the Court."); WHITE,
supra note 16, at 161 ("The most important feature of Earl Warren's chief justiceship ... was his [formida-
ble] presene.... [U]nlike [Marshall, Taney, and Hughes], Warren was not regarded as a judge possessing
considerable intellectual talents or... abilities. He was regarded as one of the great Chief Justices ... be-
cause of the intangible but undeniable impact of his presence on the Court.').
61. "Some Chief Justices have not stayed long enough to have much of an impact on the Court. [Exam-
ples are: Jay, Rutledge, and Ellsworth.] ... Chief Justices can also stay too long.... [Examples are: Marshall
and Taney]." Hall, supra note 37, at 295-96.
62. See, e.g., Brennan, A Personal Remembrance, supra note 22, at 8-9 ("giants"). See also supra note
23 (Brennan's influence).
63. A caveat is necessary because THE WARREN COURT: A RETROSPECtnVE, supra note 11, does contain
essays by Warren Court critics. See, e.g., Richard Epstein, The Takings Jurisprudence of the Warren Court: A
Constitutional Siesta, in THE WARREN COURT. A RETROSPECIVwE, supra note 11, at 159, reprinting Richard
A. Epstein, The Takings Jurisprudence of the Warren Court: A Constitutional Siesta, 31 TULSA LJ. 643
(1996); Kurland, supra note 24; Kozinski, supra note 25. See also supra notes 23 (Brennan's influence), 24
(Frankfurter revival). But see text accompanying infra note 276 (critic's praise).
64. "[IE WARREN COURT. A RETROSPECTIVE, supra note 11] commemorates the tenure of Earl Warren
as Chief Justice of the United States" O'Hara, supra note 15, at 3. "[THE WARREN COURT: A RETROSPEC-
TIvE, supra note 11] is not the place to bury the Warren Court in criticism, but to praise it." Ronald D. Ro-
tunda, The Warren Court and the Freedom of the Press, in THE WARREN COURT: A RETROSPECTIVE, supra
note 11, at 85, 97.
65. HAIL, supra note 37, at 298. See also id. at 297 ("When placed in historical perspective, Warren
emerges as perhaps the most persuasive and persistent Chief Justice the [Supreme] Court has ever had.");
KLUGER, supra note 52, at 830 ("Arrival of the Super Chief'); Brennan, A Personal Remembrance, supra
note 22, at 10 ("Super Chief").
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Even if all of this is conceded,' controversies remain. What were the
Warren Court's substantive doctrinal or jurisprudential achievements? 67 That is,
did the 1953-1969 epoch produce a significant and durable' "Constitutional
Corpus"?69 How did the Court's decision making-the process of judicial re-
view-fit within the Constitution's institutional and theoretical parameters? For
example, did the Warren Court resolve or exacerbate the anti-majoritarian di-
lemma?" Can any interpretative methodologies-theories, principles, and strat-
egies of constitutional adjudication71-be ascertained from Warren Court opin-
ions, concurrences, or dissents?' Is there any correlation between these facets
66. But see supra notes 22, 24, 63 (Warren critics).
67. For overviews, see, for example, THE WARREN COURT: A RETROSPECTIVE, supra note 11, at 21-191;
supra notes 10, 12-21, 31-36 (literature and judicial opinions).
68. On whether and, if so, the extent to which Warren Court opinions and doctrines remain extant-the
counter-revolution thesis-see, for example, Chambers, supra note 40, at 32 ("retreat from Warren Court
[state action] decisions'); Strossen, supra note 29, at 68 ("sad reversal of the Warren Court approach" to free
speech); id. at 72 ("substantial erosion in free speech protection since the Warren era"); Kanisar, supra note
43, at 145-46 ("although battered and bruised, most of the Warren Court's famous precedents remain in
place"). See also THE BURGER COURT: COUNTER-REVOLUTION OR CONFIRMATION? (Bernard Schwartz ed.,
forthcoming 1997); Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional Criminal Procedure? Two Audienc-
es, Two Answers, 94 MiC. L. REV. 2466, 2467 n.5 (1996) (bibliography on debate over "fate of the Warren
Court's criminal procedure 'revolution' in the Burger and Rehnquist Courts'); Thomson, Mirages of Certi-
tude, supra note 1, at 76 n.66 (literature on "differing assessments as to whether a change has occurred and, if
so, when and at what rate").
69. THE WARREN COURT: A RETROSPECTIVE, supra note 11, at vii (Crhe Constitutional Corpus").
70. For this dilemma and attempts to dissolve it, see, for example, BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH, supra note 2, at 16-23; Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Out-
side Article V, 55 U. CH. L. REV. 1043, 1090-96 (1988); Mark Tushnet, Policy Distortion and Democratic
Debilitation: Comparative Illumination of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 94 MICH. L. REV. 245 (1995).
71. See generally PAUL BREST & SANFORD LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DECSIONMAKtNG (3d ed. 1992); PHILIP BOBBrTr, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991); LAURENCE H.
TRIBE & MICHAEL C. DORF, ON READING THE CONSTTON (1991); HARRY H. WELLINGTON, INTERPRET-
ING THE CONSTITUTION: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE PROCESS OF ADJUDICATION (1990); David A.
Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CM. L. REV. 877 (1996); Symposium on Phillip
Bobbitt's Constitutional Interpretation, 72 TEx. L. REV. 1703 (1994).
72. Negative responses have been proclaimed. For example, "Warren and at least... Douglas, Brennan,
Fortas, and Thurgood Marshall, had little sustained interest in general matters of constitutional theory....
The Warren Court Justices were remarkable for their lack of concern about the era's main currents of consti-
tutional thought." Hall, supra note 37, at 298. For other criticism see supra note 2 (Bickel's scholarship);
KURLAND, POLITICS, supra note 15. But for more positive responses, see, for example, JEFFREY D. HOCKETr,
NEW DEAL JUSTICE: THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF HUGO L. BLACK, FEIJX FRANKFURTER, AND
ROBERT H. JACKSON (1996); TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, MR. JUSTICE BLACK AND HIs CRITICS (1988); Hall,
supra note 37, at 294-95 ("[Clonstitutive' interpretation of Warren Court" suggests that Warren Court justic-
es "realized that their most important task was.., to take doctrinal debates seriously.... [T]he Constitution,
precedents, and fundamental rights and legal principles ... influenced judicial decisionmaking."). See also
infra notes 233-35 (references). For an overview of constitutional theory debate generated by the Warren
Court, see, for example, NEIL DUXBURY, PATrERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 205-99 (1995), reprinting
Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The Process Tradition in American Jurisprudence, 15 CARDOzO L. REV. 601
(1993); CHRISTOPHER WOLFE, JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: BULWARK OF FREEDOM OR PRECARIOUS SECURITY
(1991); THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM V. JUDICIAL RESTIRAINT (David F.
Forte ed., 1972); Stephen M. Feldman, From Modernism to Postmodernism in American Legal Thought: The
Significance of the Warren Court, in THE WARREN COURT:. A RETROSPECTIVE, supra note 11, at 324, 339-48
(discussing Bickel, Wellington, Pollak, Black, Wechsler, Cox); Gary Minda, Jurisprudence at Century's End,
43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 27, 32-36 (1993); Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950s, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
561 (1988). See also supra note 2 (Bickel scholarship). For discussion of the central, unresolved dilemma of
modem American constitutional law-how to reconcile praise for Brown with condemnation of Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (state legislative prohibition on bakery employees working more than 60 hours
per week unconstitutional 14th Amendment due process deprivation)-see Thomson, Swimming in the Air,
supra note 6, at 176 n.228.
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of the Supreme Court's work and Warren Court justices' biographical profiles?
Divided into three main'I segments---"The Constitutional Corpus," "The
Justices,"75 and "A Broader Perspective"76 -The Warren Court: A Retrospec-
tive raises, without necessarily answering,' these perennial questions which
pervade virtually the whole domain of constitutional law.
m11. JUDICIAL REVIEW: 1953-1969
Almost from the start,7" commendations and condemnations were simulta-
neously hurled at the Warren Court.79 Certainly, the deluge began at 1:20 pm
73. See also THE WARREN COURT: A RETROsPECrVE, supra note 11, at 3-17 (essays by O'Hara, supra
note 15, Brennan, supra note 22, and David Halberstam, Earl Warren and His America, THE WARREN
COURT: A RETROsPECrIVp, supra note 11, at 12).
74. THE WARREN COURT: A R~rROSECTVE, supra note 11, at 21-191.
75. Id. at 195-282.
76. Id. at 285-406.
77. For example, "[o]ne of the more interesting yet unexplored issues involving the Warren Court was
the extent to which the Justices themselves appreciated the consequences of their actions." Hall, supra note
37, at 302.
78. For pre-Warren Court criticism of the Supreme Court, see generally ROBERT J. STEAMER, THE SU-
PREME COURT IN CRIsIS: A HISTORY OF CONFLicT (1971); Paul A. Freund, The Supreme Court UnderAttack,
25 U. PIrrT. L. REV. 1 (1963); Paul A. Freund, Storm Over the American Supreme Court, 21 MOD. L. REV.
345 (1958).
79. Contemporary supporters included Archibald Cox, Anthony Lewis, Black, and Karst. See supra notes
18, 36 and infra notes 92-94. Contemporary critics included Bickel, Kurland, Hand, McCloskey, and Wechs-
ler. See supra notes 2, 15 and infra notes 95-99. A small sample of epithets is reproduced in THE WARREN
COURT:. A RmrRosPEcnvE, supra note 11, at 79 ("The Communists cannot win; the NAACP cannot lose" and
"There are red cases and.., black cases"); id. at 302 (Supreme Court Justices "put the Negroes in the
schools and now [in Engel] they have driven God out"). For other condemnation and anti-Court attacks, see,
for example, LoUis FISHER, CONSTTUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS POLITICAL PROCESS 200-30
(1988) (curbing the U.S. Supreme Court via constitutional amendments, statutory reversals, court packing,
withdrawing jurisdiction, and noncompliance); EDWARD KEYNES & RANDALL K. MtILER, THE COURT VS.
CONGRESS: PRAYER, BUSING, AND ABORTION (1989); WILIAM E. LEUCHTENBERG, THE SUPREME COURT
REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 82-162, 274-99 (1995) (discussing
Franklin Roosevelt's court-packing plan); DONALD G. MORGAN, CONGRESS AND THE CONSTITUTION: A
STUDY OF RESPONSIBLITY 269-91 (1966) (discussing Senate debate on the Jenner-Butler Bill to withdraw
Supreme Court's jurisdiction over individual rights cases); WALTER F. MURPHY, CONGRESS AND THE COURT:
A CASE STUDY IN THE AMERICAN POLITICAL PROCESS (1962); JOHN R. SCHMIDHAUSER & LARRY L. BERG,
THE SUPREME COURT AND CONGRESS: CoNFucr AND INTERACT1ON, 1945-1968 (1972); WARREN, supra note
15, at 300-35 ("The Court was under attack by powerful interests nearly all the time I was there"); Michael
Comiskey, Can a President Pack-or-Draft the Supreme Court? FDR and the Court in the Great Depression
and World War II, 57 ALB. L. REV. 1043 (1994) (President Roosevelt's court-packing); William S. Dodge,
Congressional Control of Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction: Why the Original Jurisdiction Clause Sug-
gests an "Essential Role," 100 YALE LJ. 1013 (1991) (supporting the view that Congress' exceptions clause
power does not authorize the destruction of the Supreme Court's essential role); Christopher T. Handman, The
Doctrine of Political Accountability and Supreme Court Jurisdiction: Applying a New External Constraint to
Congress's Exception Clause Power, 106 YALE LJ. 197, 197 (1996) (discussing Congress's attempts and
constitutional power to strip the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction and noting that "[tihroughout the
twentieth century, fundamental changes in political power often have ushered in novel and hostile attacks on
the federal judiciary's jurisdiction"); Mark E. Herrmann, Looking Down from the Hill: Factors Determining
the Success of Congressional Efforts to Reverse Supreme Court Interpretations of the Constitution, 33 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 543 (1992); Richard A. Paschal, The Continuing Colloquy: Congress and the Finality of the
Supreme Court, 8 J.L. & POL. 143 (1991); The Supreme Court-1995 Term: Federal Jurisdiction and Proce-
dure: Exceptions Clause, 110 HARV. L. REV. 277-87 (1996) (discussing Congress' power over the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction and concluding that a literal interpretation, recognizing an expansive congressio-
nal power, rather than structural interpretations to limit Congress' power, should prevail).
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on May 17, 1954 when Chief Justice Warren finished reading" the unanimous
Brown v. Board of Education8' opinion. 2 It continued, perhaps most promi-
nently via cases such as Mapp v. Ohio,3 Miranda v. Arizona, 4 Engel v.
Vitale," Abington v. Schempp,86 Reynolds v. Sims,"7 and the obscenity deci-
80. KLUGER, supra note 52, at 887, 894 ("It was 12:52 p.m.... [Brown] was Warren's frst major opin-
ion as Chief Justice. He read it... in a firm, clear, unemotional voice .... It was 1:20 p.m. [when he fin-
ished]"). See also WARREN, supra note 15, at 3 ("I read").
81. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (state imposed racial discrimination unconstitutional).
82. On the Brown litigation process, see, for example, KLUGER, supra note 52; TUSHNET, MAKING CIvIL
RIGHTS LAW, supra note 20, at 150-231; James A. Thomson, Inside the Supreme Court: A Sanctum
Sanctorum?, 66 Miss. LJ. 178, 183 n.12 (1997) (reviewing BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE UNPUBUSHED OPIN-
IONS OF THE REHNQUIST COURT (1996)) (literature on Brown litigation process); Tushnet & Lezin, supra note
20. Subsequent analyses include ANDREw KULL, THE COLOR-BLIND CONSTITUTION (1992); DONALD E. LIVE-
LY, THE CONSTITutION AND RACE (1992); LOUIS MICHAEL SEIDMAN & MARK V. TUSHNEr, REMNANTS OF
BELIEF CONTEMPORARY CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 91-116 (1996) ("Racial Equality and the Rhetoric of Non-
discrimination"); RAE, LAW, AND CULTURE: REFLECTIONS ON BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION (Austin
Sarat ed., 1997); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Profes-
sor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881 (1995); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil
Rights Movement, 80 VA. L. REV. 7 (1994); Earl M. Maltz, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions-A
Response to Professor McConnell, 13 CONST. COMMENTARY 223 (1996); Michael W. McConnell, Segrega-
tion and the Original Understanding: A Reply to Professor Maltz, 13 CONST. COMMENTARY 233 (1996);
Michael W. McConnell, The Originalist Case for Brown v. Board of Education, 19 HARV. J. L. & PUB.
POL'Y 457 (1996); Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV.
947 (1995); Michael W. McConnell, The Originalist Justification for Brown: A Reply to Professor Kiarman,
81 VA. L. REV. 1937 (1995); David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CH.
L. REV. 935 (1989); Symposium: Brown v. Board of Education, 20 S. ILL. U. LJ. 1 (1995); Symposium,
Brown v. Board of Education After Forty Years: Confronting the Promise, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 337
(1995); Commentaries, 80 VA. L. REv. 151-99 (1994).
83. 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applied, via Fourteenth Amendment to
the states). See generally Francis A. Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf,
1961 SUP. CT. REV. 1; Stewart, supra note 29; The Supreme Court 1960 Term, Exclusion of Unconstitutional-
ly Seized Evidence, 75 HARV. L. REV. 152-58 (1961).
84. 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (inadmissibility of confessions unless Fifth amendment warnings given to sus-
pects prior to custodial interrogation). See generally IIVA BAKER, MiRANDA: CRIME, LAW, AND POLITICS
(1983); JOSEPH D. GRANO, CONFESSIONS, TRurH, AND THE LAW (1993) (discussing Miranda's policy and
doctrinal roots); Sheldon H. Elsen & Arthur Rosett, Protections for the Suspect Under Miranda v. Arizona, 67
COLuM. L. REV. 645 (1967); Kamisar, supra note 43, at 119-30 (opposing Miranda critics and Miranda's
post-Warren Court fate); Symposium, Interrogation of Criminal Defendants-Some Views on Miranda v.
Arizona, 35 FORDHAM L. REV. 169 (1966); The Supreme Court 1965 Term, [Sef Incrimination] Privilege
Applies to Custodial Interrogation, 80 HARV. L. REV. 201 (1966). See also supra note 1 (empirical debate on
Miranda).
85. 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (prayer in public schools violated First Amendment's establishment clause). See
generally Ernest J. Brown, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?-The School-Prayer Cases, 1963 SuP. CT. REv. 1;
Kurland, The Regents' Prayer Case, supra note 15; Arthur E. Sutherland, Jr., Establishment According to
Engel, 76 HARV. L. REV. 25 (1962).
86. 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (Bible reading in public schools violated First Amendment's establishment
clause). See generally WIIu/AM K. MUIR, JR., PRAYER IN THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS: LAW AND ATfuDE
CHANGE (1967) (empirical impact of Schempp). Louis H. Pollak, Foreword: Public Prayers in Public Schools,
77 HARV. L. REV. 62 (1963).
87. 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (one vote, one value state legislatures' electoral reapportionment requirement).
See supra note 54 (references).
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sions, 5 almost unabated until 19639 and beyond.' ° Inevitably, a scholarly9'
debate ensued. Distinctive and powerful positions-pro and contra the Warren
Court-quickly emerged. Early supporters included: Black,' Cox,93  and
Karst.94 Their antagonists were exemplified by Bickel,95 Hand,9 Kurland,97
McCloskey," and Wechsler." One tangible result has been the accumulation
of thought-provoking commentary. Quantitatively, The Warren Court: A Retro-
spective does not, however, enrich that repository.
88. See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity, gauged by a "prurient interest" test,
outside free speech protection); Kingsley International Pictures v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959) (overturning
New York State ban on the movie version of Lady Chatterley's Lover). See generally CURRIE, supra note 36,
at 396-99; EDWARD DE GRAziA, Gnu.S LEAN BACK EVERYwHERE: THE LAW OF OBSCENITY AND THE AS-
SAULT ON GENIUS (1992); KALvEN, supra note 52, at 35-47 (1957-69 obscenity cases); FREDERICK F.
SCHAUER, THE LAw OF OBSCENITY (1976); MARTIN SHAPmO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 157-59 (1966); Rotunda,
supra note 64, at 97 ("In the area of obscenity, the Warren Court meandered about in a series of rulings that
gave little guidance to the lower courts as to what was or was not 'obscene' in a constitutional sense.") (foot-
note omitted); Lewis, supra note 52, at 402 ("tortuous trail of decisions" which "liberated American society").
Compare infra note 134 (pornography).
89. See supra note 79 (criticism and condemnation of Supreme Court).
90. See supra note 63 (1996 criticism in THE WARREN COURT. A REmOSPECrVE, supra note 11).
91. Compare the political debate. See supra note 79 ("condemnation and anti-Court attacks").
92. Professor Charles Black, Jr. (Sterling Professor Emeritus of Law, Yale University). See, e.g.,
CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT: JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A DFiOCRACY (1960); Charles
Black, Jr., The Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, 46 WASH. L. REv. 3 (1970); Charles Black, Jr., The
Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960), reprinted in CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE
OCCASIONS OF JUSTICE 129-43 (1963); Charles Black, Foreword: "State Action," Equal Protection, and
California's Proposition 14, 81 HARV. L. REV. 69 (1967). For Black's assistance to the NAACP during
Brown litigation, see KLUGER, supra note 52, at 812, 814-15, 912.
93. Professor Archibald Cox (Carl M. Loeb University Professor, Emeritus, Harvard Law School). See,
e.g., Cox, THE WARREN COURT. CONSTITUTIONAL DECISION, supra note 36; COX, THE COURT AND THE
CONSTTUTION, supra note 36; Archibald Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of
Human'Rights, 80 HARv. L. REv. 91, 94 (1966) (Warren Court's "magnificent accomplishments'); Archibald
Cox, Chief Justice Earl Warren, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1969).
94. Professor Kenneth L. Karst (David G. Price and Dallas P. Price, Professor of Law, University of
California, Los Angeles). See, e.g., Kenneth L. Karst & Harold W. Horowitz, Reitman v. Mulkey: A Telophase
of Substantive Equal Protection, 1967 Sup. Cr. REv. 39; Kenneth L. Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional
Litigation, 1960 SuP. Cr. REV. 75. See also KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING TO AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZEN-
SHIP AND THE CONSTM ON 80 (1989) ("[lIt is proper to credit the Warren Court's decisions on racial equal-
ity for reviving the principle of equal citizenship, and thus formally redefining [America's] national communi-
ty.").
95. See supra note 2 (Bickel's publications).
96. Federal Court Judge Learned Hand. See LEARNED HAND, THE BELL OF RIGHTS (1958) (criticisms of
Warren Court and judicial review). For Hand's view of Earl Warren and the Warren Court's judicial activism
(especially via correspondence with Justice Frankfurter), see GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN
AND THE JUDoE 652-72 (1994); WHITE, supra note 16, at 179-80; James A. Thomson, Learned Hand: Evalu-
ating a Federal Judge, 22 N. KY. L. REv. 763, 805-09 (1995) (reviewing GUNTHER, supra).
97. See supra note 15 (Kurland's scholarship).
98. Robert G. McCloskey (Late Harlan Fiske Stone Professor Emeritus of Constitutional Law, Columbia
University, Law School). See, e.g., ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMEmCAN SUPRENE COURT 215-19, 221,
227-31 (1960) (Brown "not ... very well thought out"); MCCLOSKEY, supra note 36; Robert G. McCloskey,
Reflections on the Warren Court, 51 VA. L. REV. 1229 (1965); McCloskey, supra note 54.
99. Herbert Wechsler (Late Harlan Fiske Stone Professor Emeritus of Constitutional Law, Columbia
University, Law School). Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REv. 1 (1959) reprinted in HERBERT WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAmENTAL LAW: SELECTED
ESSAYS 3-48 (1961); Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REV. 1001 (1965).
On the "neutral principles" debate, see generally, Peller, supra note 72; Norman Silber & Geoffrey Miller,
Toward "Neutral Principles" in the Law: Selections from the Oral History of Herbert Wechsler, 93 COLUM.
L. REV. 854, 855 n.6 (1993) (bibliography indicating continuing influence of Wechsler's Neutral Principles
article).
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A. Substantive Doctrines
Revealing, illustrating, and explaining constitutional law, as promulgated
during 1953-1969 by the Supreme Court, is attempted in this Retrospective
through a focus on equal protection issues (especially race and state action),"o
free speech' and press,l"a religious freedom and establishment, °3 criminal
justice,"' and Takings Clause jurisprudence."5 Within this milieu, juxtapo-
sition-previous and subsequent cases against Warren Court opinions and deci-
sions'---inevitably produces a further consequence: comparative assessments
(including revolution and counter-revolution terminology" )  of "achieve-
ments" in federal" constitutional law during Chief Justices' tenures. Again,
more deft, nuanced, and intellectually intriguing examples of this enterprise
exist.It 9
Well worn starting points for explorations of Warren Court expositions of
the Constitution are obvious:"0 race, the equal protection clause, and
100. See, e.g., Chambers, supra note 40.
101. See, e.g., Strossen, supra note 29.
102. See, e.g., Rotunda, supra note 64.
103. See, e.g., John Sexton, The Warren Court and the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, in THE
WARREN COURT. A RETROSPECTIVE, supra note 11, at 104.
104. See, e.g., Kamisar, supra note 43.
105. See Epstein, supra note 63.
106. See, e.g., THE WARREN CouRr. A RErROSPEcrIVE, supra note 11, at 24-44 (Warren, Burger, and
Rehnquist Courts' race and state action decisions); id. at 69-70 (Warren, Burger and Rehnquist Courts' free
speech decisions); id. at 86-97 (Warren, Burger and Rehnquist Courts' free press decisions); id. at 104-08,
112-13 (Warren, Burger, and Rehnquist Courts' religious freedom cases); id. at 116-46 (Warren, Burger, and
Rehnquist Courts' criminal law decisions). See also supra note 68 (counter-revolution debate).
107. See supra note 68 (debate and references).
108. But see James G. Exum, Jr., & Louis D. Bilions, The Warren Court and State Constitutional Law, in
THE WARREN CouRr. A RETosPECrvE, supra note 11, at 313. See also Neely, supra note 25 (suggesting
the federalization of state product liability law).
109. See supra notes 36 (Warren Court scholarship), 68 (counter-revolution debate literature), 93 (Profes-
sor Cox). See also Paul A. Freund, The Judicial Process in Civil Liberties Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 493,
reprinted in DAVID C. BAUrM MEMORIAL LECTURES: CIVL LIBERTIES AND CIVIL RIGHTS 3 (Victor J. Stone
ed., 1997) ("synoptic view of Warren Court's treatment of civil liberties and civil rights").
110. However, for Warren, Baker v Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), "was the most important case of [his]
tenure on the Court." WARREN, supra note 15, at 306 (quoted by Schwartz, supra note 22, at 265). Warren
also "never thought" that "[t]he Brown case... was the most important case of [his] tenure on the [Supreme]
Court." WARREN, supra note 15, at 306. See also John Hart Ely, The Chief, 88 HARV. L. REV. 11, 12 (1974)
(Warren's view that if reapportionment cases had been decided before 1954, Brown would not have been
necessary); Lewis, supra note 52, at 400 ("[A]sked at the end of his life to name the most important decisions
of his years on the Supreme Court, [Warren] put the reapportionment cases at the head of the list."). Similar-
ly, "[Thurgood] Marshall... call[ed] [Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (Texas white primary uncon-
stitutional state racial discrimination),] his most significant victory-not excepting the Brown v. Board of
Education decision." JOHN EGERTON, SPEAK Now AGAINST THE DAY: THE GENERATION BEFORE THE CTM.
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 380 (1994). The reason was obvious.
No single issue, no reform, was more important to all sides than the ballot. To blacks and white
liberals, the right to vote was the prerequisite to every other reform .... To white conservatives...
the specter of a full and free franchise for five million African-American adults in the Southern States
was terrifying to contemplate.
Id. at 398. But see Freund, supra note 109, at 495 ("given the effect of reapportionment in increasing the
representation of the suburbs, and... the recalcitrance even of urban areas in carrying out their legal obliga-
tions to substitute a unitary school system for an officially segregated one" to suggest that Brown "would not
have [been] needed... seems a bit exaggerated ... [despite] the centrality of fair representation in the pro-
cess of political responsiveness").
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Brown."' That is where Chambers" 2-"Race and Equality: The Still Unfin-
ished Business of the Warren Court"--commences. Immediately, however,
problems arise. First, is a bold assertion: Brown's "central holding" was "that
separate-but-equal is constitutionally intolerable."". A deeper and more com-
plex panorama, generating greater ambivalence, could have been exposed by
plunging into the jurisprudential and precedential relationships of Plessy"5 and
Brown"6 and between Brown and affirmative action."7 Indeed, even after
1954, it has been argued that separate-but-equal is, should be, and can be con-
stitutionally tolerable if "equal" means (in judicial decrees and practical opera-
tion) equal."' Of course, emphasis has also been given, sometimes simulta-
neously, to the "separate" side of this equation."9 Secondly, Chambers is in-
consistent on the empirical impact or significance of Brown, even during the
1953-1964 era. For example:
[T]he defining decisions of the Warren era.., extended constitutional
relief to blacks through the Equal Protection Clause and aided in inspiring
presidential and congressional action .... [L]ittle [was] ... done actually
to advance enforcement of blacks' equal protection rights. Indeed, the
travesty of Brown came one year later in the 1955 Brown H "all deliber-
111. 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (state imposed racial discrimination unconstitutional). See supra note 82 (refer-
ences). See also Lewis, supra note 52, at 400 ("for most Americans the landmark of those (1953-1969] judi-
cial years was Brown v. Board of Education') (footnote omitted).
112. "Julius L. Chambers, Chancellor, North Carolina Central University; Former Director-Counsel,
NAACP Legal Defense Fund." THE WARREN CoURT. A RETROSPECIVE, supra note 11, at ix. On that De-
fense Fund and Chambers' involvement, see JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS: HOW A DEDI-
CATED BAND OF LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIViL. RIGHTS REVOLUTION 7, 11, 40, 199, 292, 341, 372, 375,
376, 388, 395, 400-01, 418, 420, 421, 422, 484, 486, 502, 504, 507, 521, 590 n.416 (1994).
113. Chambers, supra note 40.
114. Id. at 21-22. For the phrase "equal, but separate" in the 1890 Louisiana statute held constitutional in
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), see Thomson, Swimming in the Air, supra note 6, at 190 n.287. See
also id. at 178-79 n.234 (meaning and importance of terminological difference).
115. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (1890 Louisiana statute requiring "equal, but separate"
accommodation for black and white railway passengers not contravene 14th Amendment equal protection
clause). See generally Seidman, supra note 1, at 686-95 ("Plessy and the Dilemmas of Liberal Individual-
ism"); Thomson, Swimming in the Air, supra note 6, at 173-75 n.212, 177-78 n.229, 190 n.287 (references
and differing views and interpretations of Plessy).
116. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (state imposed racial discrimination unconstitu-
tional). See supra note 82 (references).
117. Unfortunately, Chambers, supra note 40, when discussing affirmative action does not explore the
relationship between Brown and affirmative action. For some attempts, see David A. Strauss, Affirmative
Action and The Public Interest, 1995 SUP. Cr. REV. 1 (discussing relationship between affirmative action and
discrimination against minorities); Thomson, Swimming in the Air, supra note 6, at 169-70 n.193, 181-82
n.248 (explanations and references).
118. See, e.g., Seidman, supra note 1, at 713-14 (postulating the consequences if Brown had "used segre-
gationist ideology as a lever to pry loose from white society massive resources that could have made the
promise of equal treatment a reality" and of "[m]aking separate facilities truly equal"). For pre-1954 argu-
ments to make separate black facilities truly and completely equal, see EGERTON, supra note 110, at 255, 272,
434, 460, 466, 469, 525, 549, 591, 592, 597, 603.
119. "[A]s many commentators from the black community have emphasized over the course of this past
generation, the Brown Court-and the Brown opinion-... faled to appreciate or manifest any awareness of
how Black America could experience-and generate-top-quality education apart from and independent of
any cheek-by-jowl classroom exposure to white folks." David J. Garrow, What the Warren Court Has Meant
to America, in THE WARREN COURn A RETROSPECTIVE, supra note 11, at 390, 392 (citing HAROLD CRUSE,
PLURAL BUT EQUAL: A CRmCAL STUDY OF BLACKS AND MINORrrmS AND AMERICA'S PLURAL SOCIETY
(1987)) (emphasis added). See also RoY L. BROOKS, INTEGRATION OR SEPARATION?: A STRATEGY FOR RA-
CIAL EQuA.rrY (1996) (postulating a middle course between racial integration and separation).
16
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 32 [1996], Iss. 4, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol32/iss4/6
19971 EARL WARREN AND SUPREME COURT HISTORY 859
ate speed" formula. Mhe Court's resolve soon weakened. [B]etween
[1958 and 1968], the Court... countenanced delay and failed to impose
clear criteria with respect to the remedial obligations of the States to
eradicate discrimination.... The Warren Court's courageous and, to a
significant degree, successful efforts to effect positive social change defy
arguments to the contrary.'
Reference to and discussion of the emerging impact debate,' including sug-
gestions that Brown retarded, rather than expedited, congressional civil rights
legislation,'" would have added alternative perspectives and, perhaps, pro-
duced different conclusions." Thirdly, given Chambers' laments about the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts' retreat from Warren Court decisions,"24 one
question emerges: Contrary to Chambers' suggestion, isn't Brown's "central
holding... in jeopardy"?"as That is, even if Brown had some-whether bene-
ficial or deleterious a----impact, has not it been undone or, at least, partially
dismantled? At this stage, only debate, not a final conclusion, exists."
Admission of failure"a slides more easily and openly from Nadine
Strossen's'29 "Freedom of Speech in The Warren Court.' ' . Two examples
120. Chambers, supra note 40, at 22, 26, 45 (footnote omitted).
121. See supra note I (empirical impact studies and debate on Warren Court decisions).
122. See, e.g., Seidman, supra note 1, at 715-17 ("Rather than sparking continued struggle for change,
[Brown] has served to deaden political debate and to legitimate the status quo"). Cf. ROSENBERG, supra note
1, at 107-10, 117-25, 155-56 (Brown's negligible or no effect or influence on congressional civil rights legis-
lation).
123. See supra note 1 (literature). Note, for example, the suggestions:
In terms of judicial effects ... Brown and its progeny stand for the proposition that courts are impo-
tent to produce significant social reform.
Ihe evidence suggests that Brown's major positive impact was limited to reinforcing the belief in a
legal strategy for change of those already committed to it.
The combination of... factors-growing civil rights pressure from the 1930s, economic changes, the
Cold War, population shifts, electoral concerns, the increase in mass communications-created the
pressure that led to civil rights .... mhe courts contributed little to [civil rights] ....
ROSENBERG, supra note 1, at 71, 156, 169. "mhe Warren Court was simply in the position of ratifying de-
cidedly more dramatic and far-reaching legislative actions [; namely, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and Voting
Rights Act of 1965,] that had been initiated by successive Presidents and approved by successive Congress-
es." Garrow, supra note 119, at 392. See also infra note 278 (backlash thesis).
124. Chambers, supra note 40, at 29-44. See also supra note 68 (counter-revolution debate literature
containing similar sentiments).
125. Chambers, supra note 40, at 21-22. Of course, most commentators and judicial nominees endorse
Brown. See, e.g., SUNsTEiN, supra note 1, at 116 ("the commitment to Brown seems nearly inevitable for all
participants in the American constitutional tradition"). See also STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION
MESS: CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL APOINTMENT PRocEss 65-68 (1994) (Brown's role in Senate confirma-
tion hearings).
126. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 122-23.
127. For recent Brown scholarship, see supra note 82.
128. Strossen, supra note 29, at 72 ("downside" in Warren Court's free speech doctrines and "guidance");
id. at 78 ("Warren Court failed to protect ... civil rights activisits from harassment by the House Un-Ameri-
can Activities Committee"); id. at 79 ("not... a perfect record" in protecting communists' "free speech").
See also infra note 137 (communists' free speech).
129. "Nadine Strossen, Professor, New York Law School; President, American Civil Liberties Union."
THE WARREN COURT: A RETROSPECIVE, supra note 11, at x. Her Warren Court publications include Nadine
Strossen, The Religion Clause Writings of Justice William 0. Douglas, in "HE SHALL NOT PASS Tins WAY
AGAIN," supra note 16, at 91-107; Nadine Strossen, Justice Harlan and the Bill of Rights: A Model for How
A Classic Conservative Court Would Enforce the Bill of Rights, 36 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 133 (1991).
130. Strossen, supra note 29.
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protrude. First, is the assertion that "the [Warren] Court's speech-protective...
rulings often did not articulate specific doctrinal analyses, and therefore did not
provide firm guidance for future Courts."'' At least for Strossen, the conse-
quence is catastrophic: subsequent Supreme Court "results" have, "without...
expressly overrul[ing] Warren Court precedents," been able to "substantial[ly]
ero[de]" First Amendment "free speech protection" and, therefore, "escape[] the
full measure of comment and criticism it would otherwise provoke."'' Oth-
ers-especially, for example, from commercial speech,' pornography,'
131. Id. at 72. See also id. ("the Warren Court's speech-affiming decisions often did not lay out precise
doctrinal or analytical guidelines"). But cf. GERALD GuNTHER, CONSTTrTONAL LAW 1222 (12th ed. 1991)
(Warren Court "prolific in its [free speech] doctrinal innovations"), quoted in Strossen, supra note 29, at 68.
132. Strossen, supra note 29, at 72 (citing Nadine Strossen, The Free Speech Jurisprudence of the
Rehnquist Court, 29 FREE SPEECH Y.B.: THE MEANING OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 83 (1991)).
133. See, e.g., STEPHEN H. SHIPP.IN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE 31, 35, 52-
53, 55, 82, 105-06, 152, 209-10 (1990) (varying perspectives on how much First amendment protection from
regulation commercial speech should obtain); CASS R. SuNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE
SPEECH xviii, 3-4, 7-9, 15, 123, 126-28, 131-32, 140, 142-43, 153-55, 158, 220-21 (1993) (opposing First
amendment protection for commeniial speech); Symposium, Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 56
U. CIN. L. REV. 1165 (1988).
134. Different perspectives on the First Amendment-pornography relationship include DONALD ALEXAN-
DER DowNs, THE NEW POLITICS OF PORNOGRAPHY (1989) (pornography protected by First amendment);
CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, ONLY WoRDs (1993) (pornography not First amendment speech); NADINE
STROSsEN, DEFENDING PORNOGRAPHY: FREE SPEECH, SEx, AND THE FIGHT FOR WOMEN'S Rio=s (1995)
(First amendment encompasses pornography); Alon Harel, Bigotry, Pornography, and the First Amendment: A
Theory of Unprotected Speech, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1887 (1992) (suggesting arguments favoring constitution-
ality of restrictions on pornographic speech); Robert C. Post, Cultural Heterogeneity and Law: Pornography,
Blasphemy, and the First Amendment, 76 CAL. L. REv. 297 (1988), reprinted in ROBERT C. POST, CONsTrrU-
TIONAL DOMAINs: DEMOCRACY, COMMuNrrY, MANAGEMENT 89-116, 356-71 (1995); Marianne Wesson, Girls
'Should Bring Lawsuits Everywhere... Nothing Will Be Corrupted: Pornography as Speech and Conduct, 60
U. CHI. L. REV. 845 (1993) (discussing anti-pornography ordinances); C. Edwin Baker, Of Course, More
Than Words, 61 U. CH. L. REV. 1181 (1994) (reviewing MACKINNON, supra) (critiquing suggested conflict
between free speech and liberty and reconstructing free speech doctrines to exclude practices silencing op-
pressed victims); Ronald Dworkin, Women and Pornography, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Mar. 3, 1994, at 36 (review-
ing MACKINNON, supra), reprinted in RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 227-43 (1996); Lynn S. Chancer, Feminist Offensives: Defending Pornography and
the Splitting of Sex From Sexism, 48 STAN. L. REv. 739 (1996) (reviewing STROSSEN, supra); Christine A.
Littleton, Old Wine in Nude Skins, 69 TEX. L. REV. 497 (1990) (reviewing DowNs, supra) (criticizing Downs
and supporting feminist pornography critiques). See also Frank 1. Michelman, Conceptions of Democracy in
American Constitutional Argument: The Case of Pornography Regulation, 56 TENN. L. REV. 291, 294 n.8
(1989) (suggesting '"pornography' is coming to be reserved for sexually explicit material indicted as harmful
to women" while "[o]bscenity' ... legally denominates sexually explicit material disvalued because of its
offensiveness to community sensibilities or generally deleterious impact on the tone of public life").
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and hate speech'35 perspectives-might not agree. 6 Secondly, the Warren
Court did not protect communists' or suspected communists' freedom of
speech. 7 In this domain, the "double standard" between "Communists
and . . . civil rights activists" '  was blatant. 9  Epigrams" and
statistics t . provide contextual and factual evidence illuminating this failure. 2
135. See generally EDWARD J. CLEARY, BEYOND THE BURNING CROSS: THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE
LANDMARK R.A.V. CASE (1994) (background and analysis of R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377
(1992)); KENT GREENWALT, FIGHTING WORDS: INDIVIDUALS, COMMUNITIES AND LIBERTIES OF SPEECH
(1995); MARl J. MATSUDA Er AL., WORDS THAT WOUND: CRITICAL RACE THEORY, ASSAULTIVE SPEECH,
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1993); SAMUEL WALKER, HATE SPEECH: THE HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN CON-
TROVERSY (1994); Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106
HARV. L. REV. 124 (1992) (suggesting that Thirteenth and Fourteenth amendments may assist in precluding
First amendment invalidation of racial hatred speech regulations); Michael A. Cullers, Comment, Limits on
Speech and Mental Slavery: A Thirteenth Amendment Defense Against Speech Codes, 45 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 641 (1995) (similar); Richard Delgado & David Yun, The Neoconservative Case Against Hate-Speech
Regulation-Lively, D'Souza, Gates, Carter, and the Toughlove Crowd, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1807 (1994)
(analysis and critique of neoconservative arguments against hate speech regulations); Edward J. Eberle, Hate
Speech, Offensive Speech, and Public Discourse in America, 29 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1135 (1994) (advocat-
ing speech-conduct dichotomy); Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Government Mo-
tive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CII. L. REV. 413 (1996) (discussing R.A.V. case to suggest that the
First amendment's primary object is uncovering improper or illicit government motives); Elena Kagan, The
Changing Faces of First Amendment Neutrality: R.A.V. v. St. Paul, Rust v. Sullivan, and the Problem of
Content Underinclusion, 1992 SuP. Cr. REv. 29 (discussing RA.V. case in context of First amendment's con-
tent neulrality doctrine); Alex Kozinski & Eugene Volokh, A Penumbra Too Far, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1639
(1993) (dissenting from Amar's Thirteenth and Fourteenth amendments racial hate speech thesis); Calvin R.
Massey, Hate Speech, Cultural Diversity, and the Foundational Paradigms of Free Expression, 40 UCLA L.
REV. 103 (1992) (contrasting assimilationist, pluralist, individualist, and culturally authoritarian paradigms'
approach to free speech and race hate regulations); Frank Michelman, Universities, Racist Speech and Democ-
racy in America: An Essay for the ACLU, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 339 (1992); Mayo Moran, Talking
About Hate Speech: A Rhetorical Analysis of American and Canadian Approaches to the Regulation of Hate
Speech, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 1425 (comparative analysis of hate speech debates); Steven H. Shriffrin, Racist
Speech, Outsider Jurisprudence, and the Meaning of America, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 43 (1994) (concluding
that First amendment does not prohibit racist speech regulation and assessing effectiveness of such regulations
in a racist society); Laurence H. Tribe, The Mystery of Motive, Private and Public: Some Notes Inspired by
the Problems of Hate Crime and Animal Sacrifice, 1993 SUP. Cr. REV. 1.
136. On Burger and Rehnquist Courts' free speech, see, for example, STANLEY H. FRIEDELBAUM, THE
REHNQUIST COURT. IN PURSUIT OF JUDICIAL CONSERVATISM 45-72, 82-85, 91 (1994); JAMES F. SIMON, THE
CENTER HOLDS: THE POWER STRUGGLE INSIDE THE REHNQUIST COURT 257-81, 320-21 (1995); Norman
Dorsen & Joel Gora, The Burger Court and Freedom of Speech, in THE BURGER COURT, supra note 13, at
28-45, 267-70. See also supra note 106 (same). See generally G. Edward White, The First Amendment Comes
ofAge: The Emergence of Free Speech in Twentieth-Century America, 95 MICH. L. REv. 199, 368-83, 387-90
(1996) (discussing the emergence, especially in relation to hate and commercial speech, of a retrenchment
theory of free speech jurisprudence).
137. Strossen, supra note 29, at 77-79. See also Lewis, supra note 52, at 402-04 ("record of the Warren
Court was less happy, and less courageous"). See generally, CURRIE, supra note 36, at 385-96 ("Reds," "Skir-
mishing," and "Surrender"); id. at 434-38 ("Curbing the Witch Hunters"); KALVEN, supra note 52, at 259,
299-399 ("Partial Sanctions: The Anti-Communist Inheritance'); id. at 457-574 ("Official Inquiry). See also
infra note 273 (Cold War).
138. Sirossen, supra note 29, at 79.
139. But for some mitigation, see infra note 142 (two excuses).
140. See supra note 79 ('The communists cannot win; the NAACP cannot lose" and "There are red cases
and ... black cases."). But see text accompanying infra note 220 (when conflicting civil rights won and prop-
erty rights lost in Warren Court).
141. See Strossen, supra note 29, at 70-71 ("parties invoking free speech rights won almost three-fourths
of their cases before the Warren Court" which was an "unusually high success rate").
142. Two mitigating factors or excuses emerge. First, the Warren Court "was sufficiently protective of
[Communists' free speech] rights to earn the vicious attacks of anti-Communists and ... to be accused of
being subject to Communist influence." Id. at 79 (footnotes omitted). Secondly, this failure occurred at "the
height of Cold War hysteria." Id. at 79. However, it is these occasions which particularly require an indepen-
dent Supreme Court. See infra note 273 (Cold War references).
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Despite such exceptions and pessimism about post-1963 developments,
Strossen's conclusion is crisp and bold: "on the whole, the Warren Court was
the most speech-protective Court that we have yet seen, leaving us a lasting
legacy of protective precedents and principles."'43 But, how-especially if
"specific doctrinal analyses" were eschewed'---was that achieved? Strossen
and Ronald Rotunda' 4 5-"The Warren Court and Freedom of the
Press"'  -suggest that a broader, more all-encompassing jurisprudence
emerged.'47 Driven by a "general spirit or attitude" to and a "broad vision of
the First Amendment,"'" two developments intertwined: "All speech [was
treated] as presumptively protected" and "artificial categories and classifications
among speech" was abandoned.'49 One result, when confronted by two First
Amendment clauses- "freedom of speech, or of the press'"--is to join, not
divide: "the Warren Court did not distinguish between 'speech' and 'the
press."".' Therefore, to conform with the Retrospective theme--"not... to
bury the Warren Court in criticism, but to praise it'"--a pivotal First
Amendment decision, New York Times v. Sullivan,'53 is, from speech and
press perspectives, eulogized.5 4 Denigration, despite being omitted from A
Retrospective,' 5 is, however, possible even with Sullivan."s6
143. Strossen, supra note 29, at 68. But see text accompanying supra note 132 (erosion of Warren Court
precedents).
144. See text accompanying supra note 131 (no specific doctrinal analysis or future guidance). But see
supra note 131 (Gunther's view of doctrinal innovations); Rotunda, supra note 64, at 86-97 (Warren Court's
"intellectual legacy" of "not distinguish[ing] between 'speech' and 'the press"' so that the First Amendment
would "cover all forms of communication").
145. "Ronald D. Rotunda, Albert E. Jenner, Jr., Professor of Law, University of Illinois." THE WARREN
COURT, supra note 11, at x.
146. Rotunda, supra note 64.
147. Despite Strossen, supra note 29 and Rotunda, supra note 64, this may be an easily dissipatable fa-
cade. See infra note 149 ("pragmatic" approach).
148. Strossen, supra note 29, at 71.
149. Id. at 70. But see id. at 71 (noting that at bottom "[t]he Warren Court had a realistic, pragmatic"
approach: "freedom of expression [was] a preferred constitutional value").
150. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble,
and to petition the government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
151. Rotunda, supra note 64, at 86. See also id. at 87, 88, 90, 98 (applying this amalgamation view to
right of access to trials, libel litigation, and campaign financing). But see id. at 99 n.8 (articles criticizing the
amalgamation view).
152. Id. at 97. Therefore, a pivotal First Amendment Warren Court decision-New York Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964), see infra note 153--can be eulogized, not denigrated. But see infra note 156 (denigra-
tion of Sullivan).
153. 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (First amendment-via Fourteenth amendment-constitutionalization of state
libel law to protect persons and corporations who defame public figures). See generally LEWIS, MAKE No
LAW, supra note 18.
154. See, e.g., Strossen, supra note 29, at 69, 72-73, 76; Rotunda, supra note 64, at 88-90 ("The protec-
tion that Sullivan and its progeny offer has benefited all of us"); Kozinski, supra note 63, at 383 ("I have no
trouble at all with Sullivan"); Lewis, supra note 52, at 402 ("freedom of all Americans to criticize their rulers,
government and government officials").
155. But see Rotunda, supra note 64, at 89 ("People have criticized Sullivan ... as being insufficiently
protective of libel defendants. Perhaps."). Note, however, the equivocation--"[p]erhaps"--and that no citations
or references are provided. Compare infra note 156.
156. See, e.g., LEWIS, MAKE No LAW, supra note 18, at 200-18 ("The Dancing Has Stopped'); id. at
219-33 ("Back to the Drawing Board?'); Epstein, supra note 32 (from an institutional perspective Sullivan
wrongly decided). For an Australian comparison, see James A. Thomson, Slouching Towards Tenterfield: The
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"[D]octrinal problems"'57 also haunt the Warren Court's religion-free
exercise and establishment' 5 -- jurisprudence.'59 Again, no necessary correla-
tion exists between doctrine and practical effects. Therefore, a concession-that
Warren Court decisions on these First Amendment clauses had "broad political
and social impact"' -can co-exist with a conclusion: those decisions "lack[]
substantive majesty.' '61 For John Sexton'62-"The Warren Court and the Re-
ligion Clauses of the First Amendment"' 63-that conclusion "partly" emanates
from "doctrinal problems, which the Warren Court either perpetuated or gener-
ated itself.' 64 Failure to contextualize-recognizing and acting upon-rela-
tionships among the religion clauses' terminology contributed to this doctrinal
disarray. First Amendment phrases were being severed, not joined." Howev-
er, exposing this "fundamental [Warren Court] weakness"'" is far removed
from a fatal or antagonistic attack. Obviating any such obloquy are statistics:
"The corpus of cases involving the Religion Clauses... decided by the Warren
Court is small .... [T]here are only ten cases in all."' 7
Constitutionalization of Tort Law in Australia, 3 TORT L. REV. 81 (1995).
157. Sexton, supra note 103, at 105.
158. See supra note 150 (First amendment).
159. See infra note 167 (ten cases). See generally CuRRiE, supra note 36, at 410-12, 444-46; Paul G.
Kauper, Church Autonomy and the First Amendment: The Presbyterian Church Case, 1969 SuP. Cr. REV.
347 (discussing Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969)); John Mansfield, Conscientious Objection-1964 Term, 1965 RELIGION & PUB.
ORD. 10. See also supra notes 85, 86 (references).
160. Sexton, supra note 103, at 104.
161. Sexton, supra note 103, at 105.
162. "John Sexton, Dean, New York University Law School." THE WARREN CouRT. A RETROSPECnvE,
supra note 11, at x.
163. Sexton, supra note 103.
164. Id. at 105.
165. Contrast the text accompanying supra notes 150-51 (amalgamation of free speech and press clauses).
166. Sexton, supra note 103, at 114.
167. Id. at 104. The ten cases are: Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (state composed prayers to be
read aloud in public schools infringed establishment clause); Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203
(1963) (bible reading and recitation of Lord's Prayer in public schools infringed establishment clause); United
States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (conscientious objectors' religious beliefs); the Sunday Closing Law
cases, McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (Maryland legislation prohibiting or limiting specified
activities, including retail sales, not contravene First amendment's establishment clause as applied to states via
Fourteenth Amendment), Two Guys from Harrison v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961) (same), Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961) (same), and Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961)
(same); Presbyterian Church v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969)
(Georgia law, permitting juries to decide church property disputes by examining whether church leaders disre-
garded their faith's tenets, unconstitutional); Fast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968) (general taxpayers have
standing to litigate establishment clause cases); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (Maryland
Constitution's requirement of officeholders declaring a belief in God unconstitutional); Epperson v. Arkansas,
393 U.S. 97 (1968) (Arkansas statute prohibiting teaching of evolution unconstitutional); Board of Education
v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) (New York's practice of giving parochial school students textbooks unconstitu-
tional); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (South Carolina unemployment compensation statute's eligi-
bility provisions unconstitutionally applied by state to deny benefits where work refused on religious
grounds). See also supra note 159 (literature on these cases). Compare the number of free speech cases. See,
e.g., Strossen, supra note 29, at 73-74 ("Numerical Indicia" indicating, for example, that "even by ... Earl
Warren's [1969] resignation, Justice Brennan [who joined the Supreme Court in 1956] had participated in
over three-hundred such cases"). Also compare infra note 211 (statistics on takings and other cases).
21
Thomson: Capturing the Future: Earl Warren and Supreme Court History
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1996
TULSA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 32:843
Much more-quantitatively and qualitatively-parades under Yale
Kamisar's' "The Warren Court and Criminal Justice."'" For example, as-
sume a revolution in constitutional law70 occurred during 1953-1964."'
Most probably,"7 it was "the Warren Court's 'revolution' in American crimi-
nal procedure... that lasted from 1961 ... to 1966 or 19 67 ."' " Familiar
cases abound: Griffin v. Illinois,74 Mapp v. Ohio,75 Gideon v. Wain-
wright,76 Escobedo v. Illinois,7' Malloy v. Hogan,' Massiah v. United
States,'79  Miranda v. Arizona,' and the lineup-pretrial identification
cases.'8' Battles or, perhaps, wars--over doctrines, practical impact, and the
168. "Yale Kamisar, Clar-nce Darrow Distinguished University Professor, University of Michigan Law
School...." THE WARREN COURr. A REROSPECrVE, supra note 11, at ix. See also supra note 13
(Kamisar's publications on the Warren Court).
169. Kamisar, supra note 43.
170. See supra notes 52, 68 (revolution and counter-revolution debate and references). See also BERNARD
SCHWARZ, THE SUPREME COURT: CONSTITrUnONAL REVOLUTiON IN RETROSPECT (1957) (characterizing the
post-1937 Supreme Court era as a constitutional revolution). More generally on constitutional law revolutions,
see, for example, William R. Casto, The Erie Doctrine and the Structure of Constitutional Revolutions, 62
Ttm. L. REV. 907 (1988); Charles Fried, Foreword: Revolutions?, 109 HARV. L. REV. 13 (1995); Robert
Justin Lipkin, The Anatomy of Constitutional Revolutions, 68 NEB. L. REV. 701 (1989); Robert Justin Lipkin,
Conventionalism, Pragmatism, and Constitutional Revolutions, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 645 (1988); James A.
Thomson, The Australia Acts 1986: A State Constitutional Law Perspective, 20 U. W. AUST. L. REV. 409,
410 n.3 (1990) (references). More historically and jurisprudentially, see Stanley N. Katz, Constitutionalism
and Revolution, 14 CARDoZO L. REv. 635 (1993); All Khan, A Legal Theory of Revolutions, 5 B.U. INr'L
LJ. 1 (1987); David AJ. Richards, Revolution and Constitutionalism in America, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 577
(1993).
171. But see supra note 52 (suggesting that Warren Court merely "built upon and expanded" prior pre-
cedents).
172. But see supra note 110 (Warren and Marshall's views that the electoral reapportionment and voting
cases constituted the revolution).
173. Kamisar, supra note 43, at 116 (footnotes omitted). See also supra note 50 (referring to Kamisar);
supra note 52 (debate as to whether there was a revolution). For a general overview, see supra note 55 (refer-
ences). For the Burger-Rehnquist Courts' counter-revolution thesis, see Streiker supra note 68. See also infra
note 190 (same).
174. 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (under certain conditions, indigent criminal defendants' right, on appeal, to a free
transcript). See, e.g., The Supreme Court 1955 Term, Cost of Criminal Appeals, 70 HARV. L. REV. 126-29
(1956).
175. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See supra note 83.
176. 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (incorporating Sixth amendment indigent criminal defendants' right, at least in
serious cases, to free counsel into Fourteenth amendment against the states). See generally LEWIs, CLAR CE
EARL GIDEON, supra note 18; Kamisar, supra note 43, at 139 (noting that initial "widespread applause" for
Gideon quickly dissipated into criticism); Jerold H. Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The "Art" of Overruling,
1963 SUP. Cr. L. REv. 211; The Supreme Court, 1962 Term, Rights of Indigents at Trial, 77 HARV. L. REV.
103-05 (1963).
177. 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (right to counsel infringed by questioning indicted or incarcerated suspects
without their lawyers' knowledge). See generally YALE KAMISAR, POuCE INTERROGATION AND CONFESSIONS:
ESSAYS IN LAW AND PoLicY 161-62 (1980) (summarizing disagreements over Escobedo's meaning); The
Supreme Court 1963 Term, Right to Counsel Before Trial, 78 HARV. L. REV. 217-23 (1964).
178. 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (self-incrimination Fifth Amendment privilege incorporated into Fourteenth
Amendment rights against the states). See generally CUtRRIE, supra note 36, at 447; The Supreme Court 1963
Term, SelfIncrimination, 78 HARV. L. REV. 223-30 (1964).
179. 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (absent counsel, the Sixth Amendment precludes using incriminating statements
purposefully obtained, after an indictment, by law enforcement officers). See generally The Supreme Court
1963 Term, supra note 177, at 217-23.
180. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See supra note 84.
181. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967); Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); Stovall v.
Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967). These Warren Court cases "applied the right to counsel to [pre-trial] identifica-
tion [lineups]." Kamisar, supra note 43, at 130. However, the Burger Court "virtually demolished" them in
what "may well be the saddest chapter in modem American criminal procedure." Id. at 131.
22
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 32 [1996], Iss. 4, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol32/iss4/6
1997] EARL WARREN AND SUPREME COURT HISTORY
legitimacy of these decisions-erupted.'82 Indeed, they have not ceased or dis-
sipated.' Proponents' and antagonistsS--from within the Supreme
Court, 86 among scholars,' in Congress,'88 and between presidential candi-
dates'---generated a whirl-wind of revolution and counter-revolution."
A Retrospective conveys that complexity. Doctrinal analysis, for example,
of the Warren Court's constitutionalization of federal and state criminal law'9'
attracted criticism not only from opponents and supporters" but also, even
when only critics were involved, "from opposite directions."'93 One result may
be that only remnants remain of the substantive aspects94 of this criminal law
revolution. 95 Even so, other benefits"9 endure. For example, the experience
gained by exposing and testing "innovative"'" formulations of constitutional
182. See generally BAKER, supra note 84; GRAHAM, supra note 55; Kamisar, supra note 43, at 119-21,
128-29, 143.
183. See, e.g., Kamisar, supra note 43 (discussing Burger and Rehnquist Courts' and scholarly attacks).
184. See, e.g., GRAHAM, supra note 55; Anthony G. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of
Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 785 (1970); Kamisar, supra note 43.
185. See, e.g., BRADLEY, supra note 55; Henry Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for
Constitutional Change, 37 U. CON. L. REv. 671 (1968). Judge Friendly has been characterized as "perhaps the
most formidable [and 'powerful'] critic of the Warren Court's criminal procedure cases." Kamisar, supra note
43, at 118, 143. See also supra notes 181, 183 (Burger and Rehnquist Courts).
186. See, e.g., Kamisar, supra note 43, at 128 ("Justice White's bitter dissent" in Miranda).
187. See supra notes 183 (supporters), 184 (critics).
188. See, e.g. Kamisar, supra note 43, at 116 ("strong criticism of the Court by many members of Con-
gress ... and the obviously retaliatory provisions of the Crime Control Act of 1968"); id. at 143 (1968 con-
gressional legislation "'repealing' ... Escobedo and Miranda" and "purporting to repeal the lineup deci-
sions") (footnote omitted). See generally ADAM CARLYLE BRECKENRmGE, CONGRESS AGAINST THE COURT
(1970) (discussing congressional reaction to Mallory and Miranda). See also supra note 79 (Congress' anti-
Court attacks).
189. See, e.g., Kamisar, supra note 43, at 116 ("strong criticism of the Court by ... presidential candidate
Richard Nixon"); id. at 139 (Supreme Court "a major political issue in the 1968 presidential campaign"); Hall,
supra note 37, at 293 (Nixon's 1968 campaign attacks and promises). "In mid-October [1968]... Nixon
went after the law-and-order issue harder than ever. He stepped up his criticism of the Supreme Court and
promised that he would name to the Court only strict constructionists:' 2 STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, NIxON: THE
TRIUMPH OF A PoLrTCiAN 201 (1989).
190. See generally supra note 68 (counter-revolution thesis). Kamisar considers that "[i]n the main, in
place of the counterrevolution in criminal procedure that many expected, 'the Burger Court waged a pro-
longed and rather bloody campaign of guerrilla warfare."' Kamisar, supra note 43, at 131 (quoting Albert W.
Alschuler, Failed Pragmatism: Reflections on the Burger Court, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1436, 1442 (1987)).
191. Cf. supra note 153 (constitutionalization of state libel law); Thomson, supra note 156 (same).
192. See Kamisar, supra note 43, at 119-21 ("Criticism of Miranda-From Opposite Directions"). That is,
there were conservative and liberal Miranda critics.
193. Id. at 139 (emphasis omitted). See also Hall, supra note 37, at 293-95 (postulating differing ap-
proaches to Warren Court: the "traditional, consensus approach" and the "three schools of revisionist scholar-
ship').
194. But cf. text accompanying infra notes 237-39 (institutional aspects-judicial activism and methods of
constitutional interpretation-of the Warren Court still resonate).
195. See supra note 68 (debate on whether, and, if so, the extent to which Warren Court opinions and
doctrines remain extant). See also supra note 181 (demolition of Warren Court lineup cases). See also
Kozinski, supra note 25, at 382 ("very little is left of the Warren Court legacy"); Lewis, supra note 52, at 405
("conclud[ing] that the Warren Court's bold efforts in the criminal law field were less successful, less lasting,
than in reapportionment or race or freedom of expression").
196. Of course, especially for conservative critics and some liberal critics, see supra notes 192-93, there
are also detriments.
197. Hall, supra note 37, at 298 ("The majority of [Warren Court] Justices invariably adopted innovative
approaches to major constitutional controversies.").
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rules, commands and doctrines." 8 Perhaps simultaneously, that is implicated
in and was a reaction to the relationship between such doctrinal developments,
their durability, and intense political and public pressures on the Supreme
Court. 99 During 1953-1969 such extraneous pressures, though probably most
vociferous and sustained against constitutional decisions limiting law enforce-
ment power to investigate and prosecute crimes,m° were not unusual."' Of
course, when placed within a longer historical continuum, this is clearly not a
unique Warren Court phenomenon. Consequently, any sympathy A Retro-
spective invokes for the Warren Court can easily be diluted. As that occurs, re-
assessments of the 1961-1967 criminal law revolution's doctrinal edifice may
produce new revisionist syntheses starkly at variance with A Retrospective.'
In complete contrast, "quiescence," not "tumult" characterizes judicial
review of property rights and economic liberties during 1953-1969 5 For sev-
eral reasons, as Richard Epstein --"The Takings Jurisprudence of the
Warren Court: A Constitutional Siesta"s--indicates, "[the question of prop-
erty rights, their status, and protection, was not an issue that much troubled or
preoccupied the Warren Court." Therefore, from a doctrinal perspective, the
takings clause jurisprudence provides a "far more meager [harvest] than it is in
other areas."2 ' At most, "the Warren Court's takings decisions help[] set the
198. See supra note 71 (references). For example, Chief Justice Warren's Miranda opinion, "laying out
what amounted to a code of police procedure after arrest, seemed to some more legislative than judicial in
character." Lewis, supra note 52, at 405. Another benefit may be "'the dynamic of change [which] may well
be more significant than many of the solutions proposed by the Warren Court."' Kamisar, supra note 43, at
146 (quoting Francis A. Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and the Criminal
Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, 539).
199. See supra notes 79, 188-89 (congressional, presidential and public attacks on the Warren Court).
200. See supra note 182 (references).
201. For example, attacks on Warren Court race, school prayer and bible reading, and reapportionment
decisions. See supra notes 79 (references). "[A]s much as [at] any time in [America's] history ... controver-
sy ... usually characterized reaction to the Warren Court.... [M]any ... of its landmark rulings produced
real hostility, disobedience, and... calls for [Justices'] impeachment .... Particularly controversial were ...
school prayer cases, pro-Communist speech and protest decisions [and] obscenity rulings... Hall, supra
note 37, at 306.
202. See supra note 78 (pre-Warren Court). For pre- and post-Warren Court pressures, see, for example,
KEYNES & MILLER, supra note 79; MORGAN, supra note 79; MURPHY, supra note 79; SCHMMHAUSER &
BERG, supra note 79.
203. See, e.g., Streiker, supra note 68 (proposing a "decision" and "conduct" rules dichotomy).
204. Epstein, supra note 63, at 160.
205. For pre- and post-1953-1969 cases and doctrines, see id. at 159-62. See generally Thomson, Swim-
ming in the Air, supra note 6 (examining property and civil rights in the Fuller Court and juxtaposing Warren
Court's Brown decision); supra note 72 (central, unresolved constitutional law dilemma).
206. See Epstein, supra note 63, at 160-62 (historical explanation concerning Lochner and the 1937 New
Deal "revolution on the status of property rights" and political explanation because of 1953-1969 "legislative
agenda did not force the [Supreme] Court to mediate between aggressive state regulators and beleagured prop-
erty owners").
207. "Richard A. Epstein, James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, University of Chica-
go Law School.. . ." THE WARREN CouRT. A RETROSPECrIVE, supra note 11, at ix.
208. Epstein, supra note 63.
209. Id. at 159. "[llnsofar as the focus ... is the protection of property rights and economic liberties,
there is little energy, excitement, or sense of intellectual adventure in the Warren Court." Id. at 160.
210. Id. at 162.
[Vol. 32:843
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stage for contemporary understandings of the takings issue."2 ' However, there
are also connections with larger themes in A Retrospective. First is the contrast
between retaining (in property rights litigation) and rejecting (in criminal law
cases) the status quo.212 Second is the suggestion that "the modem Civil
Rights movement'"213 dominated and skewed 1953-1969 doctrinal develop-
ments, for example, in free speech,2 4  criminal law,215  and takings" 6
cases.21 7 Epstein vigorously conveys this perspective:
[F]or takings law there was no innovation [in Heart of Atlanta Motel v.
United States2 ] ....
[F]or the Court to innovate on takings in the context of civil rights would
have been too suicidal for its political survival. The powerful New Deal
conception that property does not include the right to pick one's trading
partners was a status quo position that the Warren Court was eager to
embrace.
211. Id. at 162. See also id. at 160 (listing six Warren Court "takings cases"). "Between 1953 and 1969
the [Supreme] Court did not declare a single piece of federal legislation regulating property unconstitutional
and it invalidated only a few state laws regulating industry and providing welfare programs as interferences
with contract or property rights." Hall, supra note 37, at 300. For other constitutional law areas which the
Warren Court "ignored" see Kozinski, supra note 25, at 382-83 ("four copyright cases... [olnly three cases
even mention the Contract Clause ... [and] three trademark cases"). Compare supra note 167 (number of
free speech and religion cases).
By staking out certain constitutional areas in which it took an intense interest, and giving short shrift
to others, the Warren Court contributed to the now widespread perception that there really is no such
thing as constitutional law, that it's all a matter of the philosophy of the particular judges who are
making the decision.
Kozinski, supra note 25, at 384 (emphasis in original).
212. Compare text accompanying supra notes 170-90 (criminal law "revolution") with text accompanying
supra notes 209-10 (property cases "meager").
213. Epstein, supra note 63, at 175. On this "modern" movement see, e.g., TAYLOR BRANCH, PARTING
THE WATERS: MARTIN LuTHER KING AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 1954-63 (1988); SETH CAGIN &
PHLuP DRAY, WE ARE NOT AFRAID: THE STORY OF GOODMAN, SCHWERNER AND CHANEY AND THE CIVIL
RIGHTS CAMPAIGN FOR MISSISSIPPI (1988); DAvID J. GARRow, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING,
JR., AND THE SoUTrHERN LEADERsHIP CONFERENCE (1986); STEVEN KASHER, TIE CIviL RIGHTS MOVEMENT.
A PHOTOGRAPHIC HSTORY 1954-68 (1996); ROBERT J. NORRELL, REAPING THE WHIRLWIND: THE CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN TUSKEGEE (1985); FRED POWLEDGE, FREE AT LAST? THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT
AND THE PEOPLE WHO MADE IT (1991); JAMEs R. RALPH, JR., NoRTHERN PROTES. MARTIN LUTrHER KING,
JR., CICAGO, AND THE Civit. RIGHTS MOVEMENT (1993); THE CIvIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN AMERICA
(Charles W. Eagles ed., 1986). For the earlier (1930s and 1940s) movement, see EGERTON, supra note 110.
214. See, e.g., Strossen, supra note 29, at 74-77 ("First Amendment legal holdings arose in the factual
context of the struggle for racial justice!). For elaborations see LEWIS, MAKE No LAW, supra note 18; Fred
D. Gray, The Sullivan Case: A Direct Product of the Civil Rights Movement, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1223
(1992).
215. See, e.g., Kamisar, supra note 43, at 117-19 ("The Relevance of the Struggle for Civil Rights").
216. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 63, at 160, 173-75 ("Civil Rights Cases").
217. For the civil rights movement's general influence on the 1953-1969 Supreme Court and Earl Warren,
see, for example, Hall, supra note 37, at 299-300 ("Like Courts of other eras, the Warren Court had a recipro-
cal and reinforcing relationship with its own times .... The Warren Court was very much in ... the stream
of history .... The Justices operated in a political culture .... The Warren Court ... was a product of its
time, just as were previous Courts.") (emphasis in original).
218. 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (Congress' interstate commerce power sustained the Civil Rights Act of 1964
prohibition of racial discrimination in public accommodation). See generally CuRE, supra note 36, at 425;
The Supreme Court 1964 Term, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 79 HARv. L. REv. 128-32 (1965).
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Yet so strong was the Warren Court's commitment on discrimination that
it was prepared [in Reitman v. Mulke' '] to strike down the reinstate-
ment of the common law position [that treats the right to dispose of prop-
erty to whomsoever one sees fit as an ordinary property right] even
though it would not dare to require some antidiscrimination law in private
housing. Any conflict between property rights and the modem Civil
Rights movement could come out only in one way.
B. Theory and Process
Dialogue about methodology-fundamental questions concerning consti-
tutional interpretation,"' comparative institutional power, legitimacy, and
competence tm and judicial deference or activism---does not dominate The
Warren Court: A Retrospective.' Whether or not intended, this perpetuates a
particular view:
219. 387 U.S. 369 (1967). See generally CURRI, supra note 36, at 420; Black, Foreword, supra note 92;
Karst & Horowitz, supra note 94.
220. Epstein, supra note 63, at 174-175 (footnote omitted). Cf. text accompanying supra note 138 (com-
munist-civil rights double standard).
221. See supra notes 1, 71-72 (references).
222. First, for normative and empirical aspects of congressional and presidential constitutional
decisionmaking and interpretation, see David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Third Congress,
1793-1795, 63 U. CM. L. REV. 1 (1996); David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Second Con-
gress, 1791-1793, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 606 (1996); David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The First
Congress and the Structure of Government, 1789-1791, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 161 (1995); David P.
Currie, The Constitution in Congress: Substantive Issues in the First Congress, 1789-1791, 61 U. CII. L.
REv. 775 (1994); Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 905 (1990); James A.
Thomson, An Australian Bill of Rights: Glorious Promises, Concealed Dangers, 19 MEL. U.L. REV. 1020,
1026 n.24 (1994) (references); Symposium, Executive Branch Interpretation of the Law, 15 CARDOZO L. REV.
21 (1993); Symposium, Elected Branch Influences in Constitutional Decisionmaking, 56 L. & CONTEP.
PROBs. 1 (1993). Secondly, for debates on who-Supreme Court, Congress, President, or the People-is the
ultimate constitutional authority, see Thomson, supra, at 1026 n.24 (references on judicial supremacy); id. at
1034 nn.62-63 (Congress' power, for example, under U.S. CONST. amend. X1V, § 5); infra note 266 (political
question doctrine). Thirdly, for suggestions that Congress is the pre-eminent protector of individual rights, see
Thomas C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretative Guide to the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act, 39 ViiL. L. REV. 1, 2 (1994) ("Mhe most important step in protecting the constitutional right of
free exercise of religion has come not from the federal courts, but from Congress.") (footnote omitted); Henry
P. Monaghan, Book Review, 94 HARV. L. REV. 296, 310 (1980) (reviewing JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICLAL RE-
viEw AND THE NATIONAL PoLmCAL PROCEss: A FUNCtIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE
SUPREmE COURT (1980)) (Congress and states have established most rights and these are above minimum
constitutional requirements). See also supra note 70 (judicial review's antimajoritarian conundrum).
223. See generally WOLFE, supra note 72; THE SUPRmE COURT, supra note 72; David P. Bryden, A
Conservative Case for Judicial Activism, 111 PUB. INTEREST 73 (1993) (noting that New Deal "liberal
restraintists" have replaced liberal "activists" but that conservatives remain restraintists and create "very few
conservative rights"); David P. Bryden, Is the Rehnquist Court Conservative?, 109 PUB. INTERs 73 (1992)
(noting that the Rehnquist Court is not creating liberal or conservative rights); Lino A. Graglia, Judicial Activ-
ism: Even on the Right It's Wrong, 95 PUB. INTEREST 57 (1989); Alpheus T. Mason, Judicial Activism: Old
and New, 55 VA. L. REv. 385 (1969).
224. But for some glimpses, see THE WARREN COURT. A RMoSPECTIVE, supra note 11, at 143-44 (con-
gressional legislation versus Supreme Court decisions); id. at 205 ("Justice Brennan's use of history" in con-
stitutional adjudication); id. at 285 (Warren Court's "common law approach to constitutional analysis" and
Thayerian "dark side" to judicial activism which "has tempted [Americans] into shirking our responsibili-
ty ... to resolve [social problems] in ... nonjudicial arenas"); id. at 301-02 (judicial activism prior to and in
Warren Court); id. at 338-48 (constitutional theory in Warren era); id. at 401 (Congress' Fourteenth Amend-
ment responsibilities); id. at 405 (Harlan's view that Court's "constitutional function" was not social reforma-
tion).
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Warren and at least four other of his colleagues, Douglas, Brennan,
Fortas, and Thurgood Marshall, had little sustained interest in general
matters of constitutional theory. Such behavior, while not unique, certain-
ly stood out from the practices of the nineteenth century .... The Warren
Court Justices were remarkable for their lack of concern about the era's
main currents of constitutional thought .... In this setting, the role of a
Justice was to figure out the right answer, as a matter of public necessity
and not some abstract theory of justice.
Like takings clause jurisprudence, A Retrospective conveys the impression
that only scholars' and some othersp not Supreme Court Justices, partici-
pated in "the era's main currents of constitutional thought.' "ras Even if
five,m out of seventeen," Justices "constitute" the Warren Court, other
Justices, notably"a Frankfurteraa Harlan,a4  and Black, 5  did lead and
stimulate these debates over constitutional decision making processes. Such
controversies, encompassing passive virtues, judicial activism, and anti-
majoritarian features and consequences of judicial review, are encapsulated
within an extensive repository of the United States Reports and academic litera-
225. Hall, supra note 37, at 298-99.
226. This is an example where scholars, not the Supreme Court, led. See Epstein, supra note 63, at 162
("The academic scholarship on the Takings Clause has turned out at least in part to be more influential than
the decisions of the Court itself.").
227. Compare text accompanying supra note 225 (Justices' "little sustained interest") with Feldman, su-
pra note 72 at 340-43 (discussing scholars' constitutional law theories: Sacks, Bickel, Wellington, Brown,
Wechsler, Pollak, Black, Gunther).
228. See, e.g., supra note 185 (Judge Henry Friendly); Feldman, supra note 72, at 360 nn.1 10, 124 (citing
scholarship by Judge Learned Hand, see supra note 96, and Judge Skelly Wright).
229. Hall, supra note 37, at 298.
230. Id. (Warren, Douglas, Brennan, Fortas, and Marshall). There may be more than five. See id. ("War-
ren and at least four of his colleagues") (emphasis added).
231. See supra note 40 (list of 17 Justices).
232. Other Justices could also be included. See, e.g., HOCKE'r, supra note 72, at 215-88 (Jackson);
KLUGER, supra note 52, at 729-31, 771 (Jackson's attempt, via U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5, to have Con-
gress take constitutional responsibility for enforcing equal protection clause's mandate against racially seg-
regationist states); Lewis, supra note 52, at 401 (same).
233. See generally HIRSCH, supra note 15; RICHARD G. STEvENS, FRANKFURTER AND DiE PROCESS
(1987); UROFSKY, FELIX FRANKFURTER, supra note 19; Michael Ariens, A Thrice-Told Tale, Or Felix the Cat,
107 HARv. L. REv. 620 (1994); Paul Freund, Mr Justice Frankfurter, 26 U. CItL L. REV. 205 (1959); Sanford
V. Levinson, The Democratic Faith of Felix Frankfurter, 25 STAN. L. REV. 430 (1973); Mary Brigid
McManamon, Felix Frankfurter: The Architect of "Our Federalism", 27 GA. L. REV. 697 (1993); Nathaniel
L. Nathanson, Mr Justice Frankfurter and the Holmes Chair: A Study in Liberalism and Self Restraint, 71
NW. U. L. REv. 135 (1976); Alfred S. Neely, Mr Justice Frankfurter's Iconography of Judging, 82 KY. LJ.
535 (1993-94); Sanford Victor Levinson, Skepticism, Democracy, and Judicial Restraint An Essay on the
Thought of Oliver Wendell Holmes and Felix Frankfurter 171-324 (1969) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Harvard University) (on file with author). See also infra note 259 (references), 266 (Frankfurter's role in
Brown).
234. See generally TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH, JOHN MARSHALL HARLAN: GREAT DISSENTER OF THE WAR-
REN COURT (1992); THE EVOLUTION OF A JUDICIAL PHILOSOPHY: SELECTED OPINIONS AND PAPERS OF JUS-
TICE JOHN M. HIARLAN (David L. Shapiro ed., 1969); Symposium, Centennial Conference in Honor of Justice
John Marshall Harlan 36 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1 (1991). See also supra note 16 (Dorsen's Harlan publica-
tions).
235. See generally ROGER K. NEWMAN, HUGO BLACK: A BIOGRAPHY (1994); Thomson, Mirages of Cer-
titude, supra note 1, at 69 n.10 (bibliography of pro-Black scholars); id. at 70 n.ll (bibliography of anti-Black
scholars); id. at 77-80 (comparing and contrasting Black and Frankfurter's methods and theories of constitu-
tional adjudication and interpretation). See also infra note 254 (references).
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ture. 6 Importantly, even if substantive Warren Court doctrines have been re-
pudiated,'3' these perennial process puzzles 38 continue to resonate.3 For
example, Supreme Court activism, whether to constitutionalize liberal or con-
servative values, is criticized and eulogized often with attackers and defenders
switching roles and allegiances'" depending on whether their values command
four or five votes. 24' Attributing the vitality and richness of this aspect of judi-
cial review to the Warren Court would, therefore, not be remiss.
236. See supra notes 1, 10-21, 71-72, 92-99 (references).
237. See supra notes 78 (counter-revolution thesis), 181 (demolition of criminal law lineup cases), 195
("very little is left"). But for remnants of hope, see Kamisar, supra note 43, at 145-46 ("although battered and
bruised, most of the Warren Court's famous precedents remain in place-waiting for a future court to reclaim
the torch") (footnote omitted).
238. Compare the similar conundrums confronting, for example, the Chase (1864-1873) and Fuller (1888-
1910) Courts, over judicial review of property, economic, and civil rights adumbrated in HAROLD M. HYMAN,
Tim RECONSTRUCTION JUSTICE OF SALMON P. CHASE (1996); Thomson, Not a Trivial Pursuit, supra note 6;
Thomson, Swimming in the Air, supra note 6.
239. For example, whether, and, if so, how, judicial review should differentiate between speech, property,
and economic rights. Compare Richard A. Epstein, Property, Speech, and the Politics of Distrust, 59 U. Cm.
L. REv. 41 (1992) (advocating strengthening judicial review vis-a-vis property and economic rights so as to
equate with free speech judicial review) with Frank 1. Michelman, Liberties, Fair Values, and Constituitonal
Method, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 91 (arguing for retention of differential elevation of free speech's judicial protec-
tion over property). Another example is in Martin H. Redish, The Passive Virtues, The Counter-Majoritarian
Principle, and The "Judicial-Political" Model of Constitutional Adjudication, 22 CONN. L. REV. 647 (1990)
(testing Bickel's 1960s theories, see supra note 2, against "standards of modem constitutional and political
theory concerning the judiciary's proper role within [the American] system").
240. Generally, pre-1937, conservatives applauded and liberals denigrated the Supreme Court; from 1937-
1969 liberals applauded and conservatives denigrated; and post-1969 their positions are, again, reversed. For
pre-Warren Court examples, see Thomson, Mirages of Certitude, supra note 1, at 81 (noting difference in
liberals pre-1937 denigration of and post-1937 applause for "vigorous" judicial review); James A. Thomson,
Making Choices: Tribe's Constitutional Law, 33 WAYNE L. REV. 229, 240 n.48 (1986) (reviewing LAURENCE
H. TRmE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOiCEs (1985)) (characterizing as "[t]ransient advocates of judicial activism"
conservatives and liberals who after 1937 reversed their attitude towards judicial activism and review). Simi-
larly, conservatives who opposed Warren Court activism now applaud Rehnquist Court activism. See, e.g.,
Bryden, A Conservative Case, supra note 223 (arguments for Supreme Court creation of conservative rights);
Graglia, supra note 223, at 62-74 (discussing conservatives who support Rehnquist Court activism); Earl
Maltz, The Prospects of a Revival of Conservative Activism in Constitutional Jurisprudence, 24 GA. L. REV.
629 (1990) (suggesting breakage in link between liberalism and judicial activism and postulating emergence
of a more aggressive conservative judicial activism). For an analysis of judicial review theories sustaining
conservative activism (and liberalism's critiques), see Epstein, supra note 239; Michelman, supra note 239;
Frank L Michelman, Property, Federalism, and Jurisprudence: A Comment on Lucas and Judicial Conserva.
tism, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 301 (1993); Mark Tushnet, Conservative Constitutional Theory, 59 TuL. L.
REV. 910 (1995). See also text accompanying infra note 266 (postulating judicial review dilemma for liber-
als).
241. Compare the statement attributed to Justice Brennan when emerging from "a heated conference" of
the Justices: "Five votes can do anything around here." BERNARD ScVwARz, DECISION: How THE SUPREME
COURT DEcmEs CASES 6, 8, 146 (1996). See also SIMON, supra note 136, at 43, 54 (same). Also compare
Learned Hand's Feb. 6, 1934 Letter to Justice Stone: "Who in hell cares what anybody says about [constitu-
tional questions] but the Final Five of the August Nine ... " ALPHEUS T. MASON, HARLAN FISKE STONE:
PILLAR OF THE LAw 384 (1956).
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IV. THE JUSTICES
Only six242 of the seventeen 3 Warren Court members are allocated
separate essays in The Warren Court: A Retrospective. However, reasons for
this choice, in addition to the suggestion that they are "the six greatest Justices
of the Warren era, '  are less than obvious. In contrast, three factors indicate
why others,245 but not the "greatest" six, should have been chosen. First, each
of the six is already the subject of probing biographies and a plethora of arti-
cles.2' Secondly, with rare exceptions, 7 A Retrospective does not provide
new information, material, or revisionist perspectives. Thirdly, much less has
been published on other Warren Court justices. Essays on Jackson, '
Clark,249 White," ° and Goldberg,sl for examples 2 might have supplied
previously unrevealed information from their personal papers, such as draft
242. Justices Black, Brennan, Douglas, Frankfurter, Harlan, and Chief Justice Warren. See infra notes
254-59 (references). Compare the separate essays in THE WARREN COURT IN HISTORICAL AND PoLmcAL.
PERspECTvE, supra note 10, at 37-50 (Warren); id. at 51-63 (Frankfurter); id. at 64-85 (Douglas); id. at 86-
105 (Black); id. at 109-22 (Harlan); id. at 123-36 (Brennan); id. at 139-54 (White); id. at 155-68 (Fortas).
243. See supra note 40 (Justices' names and tenure dates).
244. O'Hara, supra note 15, at 5.
245. For example, Justices Jackson, Clark, Goldberg, Fortas and Stewart. See infra notes 248-52 (refer-
ences).
246. See infra notes 254-59 (references).
247. See, e.g., THE WARREN COURT:. A RETRosPEcTIVE, supra note 11, at 5, 229-34 (unpublished letters
to and from Felix Frankfarter). See also infra note 259 (published Frankfurter letters).
248. See, e.g., EUGENE C. GERHART, AMERICA'S ADVOCATE: ROBERT H. JACKSON (1958); HOCKErT,
supra note 72; GLENDON SCHUBERT, DISPASSIONATE JUSTICE: A SYNTHESIS OF THE JUDICIAL OPINIONS OF
ROBERT H. JACKSON (1969); MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: FOUR LECTURES IN HIS HONOR (1969); Daniel A.
Farber, Robert Houghwout Jackson, in THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 16, at 257-62; Paul A.
Freund, Mr Justice Jackson and Individual Rights, in MR. JUSTICE JACKSON: FOUR LECTUS IN Hs HONOR,
supra, at 29, 34-56; Paul A. Freund, Individual and Commonwealth in the Thought of Mr. Justice Jackson, 8
STAN. L. REV. 9 (1955); Philip B. Kurland, Justice Robert H. Jackson-Impact on Civil Rights and Civil Liber-
ties, in SIx JUSTICES ON CIVIL RIGHTS 57-82 (Ronald D. Rotunda ed., 1983); Philip B. Kurland, Robert H.
Jackson, in 4 THE JUSTICES, supra note 18, at 1282-1311. See also supra note 232 (Jackson's deference).
Professor Dennis J. Hutchinson is writing a Jackson biography. UROFSKY, FELIX FRANKFURTER, supra note
19, at 222.
249. See, e.g., Michael R. Belknap, Tom Campbell Clark, in THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note
16, at 113-19; Richard Kirkendall, Tom C. Clark, in 4 THE JUSTICES, supra note 18, at 1347-60; Thomas M.
Mengler, Public Relations in the Supreme Court: Justice Tom Clark's Opinion in the School Prayer Case, 6
CONST. COMMENTARY 331 (1989); A SYMPOSIUM ON THE TOM C. CLARK PAPERS, MARCH 19, 1985 (1987)
(Tarlton Law Library, School of Law, University of Texas at Austin); BIOBIBLIOGRAPHY OF JUSTICE TOM C.
CLARK (Tarlton Legal Bibliography Series, No. 27, 1985).
250. See, e.g., Leon Friedman, Byron R. White, in 4 THE JUSTICES, supra note 18, at 1574-1606; William
E. Nelson, Byron White, in THE WARREN COURT IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 10,
at 139-54; William E. Nelson, Byron Raymond White, in THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 16, at
517-24; Rex E. Lee, On Greatness and Constitutional Vision: Justice Byron R. White, 1993 J. SUP. CT. HIST.
5.
251. See, e.g., STEBENNE, supra note 48; Hernman, supra note 48.
252. Justice Fortas might also be included. See, e.g., LAURA KALMAN, ABE FoRTAs: A BIOGRAPHY
(1990); BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, FoRTAs: THE RISE AND RUIN OF A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE (1988); Jona-
than Kahn, Abe Fortas, in THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 16, at 169-70; James A. Thomson,
Repudiation and Revenge: Abe Fortas's Southern Connection, 1 GA. J.S. LEGAL HIST. 495 (1991) (reviewing
KALMAN, supra). On a much less well known Warren Court justice, see, for example, WILLIAM F. RADCLIFF,
SHERMAN MINTON: INDIANA'S SUPREME COURT JUSTICE (1996).
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opinions, letters, or intra-court memoranda," 3 and produced fresh insights
about the Warren Court. That is, rejuvenation, not regurgitation, is required.
Regrettably, the latter, not the former, predominates in A Retrospective.
Therefore, not unexpectedly, encomiums flow profusely to Black,24
Brennan, 5 Douglas,"ss and Warren. 7 Even Harlan is re-shaped into and
praised as a liberal activist judge. 8 Of the six, only one remains: Felix
253. For the existence, publication, and usefulness of such materials, see Thomson, supra note 82. For the
location of these papers, see ALEXANDRA K. WIGDOR, THE PERSONAL PAPERS OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES:
A DESCRITriVE GUIDE (1986); LOCATION GUIDE TO THE MANUSCRIPTS OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES
(Adrienne de Vergie & Mary K. Kell comp., Tarlton Law Library Legal Bibliography Series, No. 16, Sept.,
1978). For an example, see Mengler, supra note 249 (draft opinion in Clark papers); A SYMPOSIUM ON THE
TOM C. CLARK PAPERS, supra note 249.
254. See Bernard Schwartz, Hugo Black, in Tim WARREN COURT. A RETROSPECTIVE, supra note 11, at
195-210. See generally HOWARD BALL, HUGO BLACK: COLD STEEL WARRIOR (1996); GERALD T. DUNNE,
HUGO BLACK AND Tm JUDICIAL REVOLUTION (1977); TONY FREYER, HUGO L. BLACK AND THE DILEMMA
OF AMERICAN LIBERALISM (1990); NEWMAN, supra note 235. See also supra note 235 (pro- and anti-Black
scholars).
255. See, e.g., Richard S. Arnold, William J. Brennan, Jr., in THE WARREN COURT. A RETROSPECIVE,
supra note 11, at 204-09; Exun & Bilionis, supra note 23, at 316. See generally KIM ISAAC EISLER, A
JUSTICE FOR ALL. WILLIAM J. BRENNAN, JR. AND TM DECISIONS THAT TRANSFORMED AMERICA (1993);
REASON AND PASSION, supra note 12; Stephen J. Wermiel, William Joseph Brennan, Jr., in THE SUPREME
COURT JUSTICES, supra note 16, at 49-60. See also supra note 23 (the Brennan Court); Thomson, Mirages of
Certitude, supra note 1, at 77 n.73 (references on scholarship on Brennan).
256. See, e.g., BALL & COOPER, supra note 1; SIMON, supra note 14; "HE SHALL NOT PASS THIS WAY
AGAIN," supra note 16; THE DOUGLAS LETTERS, supra note 19; John P. Frank & Vern Countryman, William
0. Douglas, in 4 THE JUSTICES, supra note 18, at 1219-46; Dorothy J. Glancy, William Orville Douglas, in
THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 16, at 141-51. See also Thomson, Mirages of Certitude, supra
note 1,'at 69-70 nn.10-11 (bibliography of pro- and anti-Douglas scholars).
257. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 22; Brennan, supra note 22; Hall, supra note 37, at 296-98; Tyrone
Brown, Clerking for the Chief Justice, in THE WARREN COURT. A RETROSPECTIVE, supra note 11, at 276-82.
See also supra note 22 (the Warren Court). See generally SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF, supra note 12; WHITE,
supra note 16; Daniel B. Rodriguez, Earl Warren, in THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 16, at 501-
09.
258. See supra note 234 (references).
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Frankfurter 9 Again, A Retrospective does not surprise. At least on two occa-
sions Frankfurter is pilloried:
... Frankfurter's star has dimmed considerably .... There were flaws in
Frankfurter's makeup and judgment that eventually undermined his re-
markable gifts and learning.
... Frankfurter may have been a better letter writer than he was a judge.
With all his intellect and scholarly talents, Frankfurter's judicial career
remained essentially a lost opportunity. As far as public law was con-
cerned, he may well have had more influence as a law professor than as a
Supreme Court Justice.
Only Kurland,u2 "a stalwart partisan of Frankfurter's"'M offers praise:'
[Frankfurter], along with [Learned] Hand [was] one of the two greatest
judicial minds to have served on the bench in [Kurland's] lifetime.
[O]ne factor ... disqualified [Frankfurter] from great influence within the
Court and great popularity outside the Court. His notion of the constitu-
259. See generally LIrVA BAKER, FELIX FRANKFURTER: A BIOGRAPHY (1969); BURT, supra note 34;
HIRSCH, supra note 15; HOCKETT, supra note 72, at 141-214; CLYDE E. JACOBS, JUSTICE FRANKFURTER AND
CIVL LIBERTIES (1961); PHILIP B. KURLAND, MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER AND THE CONSTIUrION (1971);
WALLACE MENDELSON, JUSTICES BLACK AND FRANKFURTER: CONFLICT IN THE COURT (2d ed. 1966); BRUCE
ALLEN MURPHY, THE BRANDEIS/FRANKFURTER CONNECTION: THE SECRET POLITICAL ACTIVITIES OF TWO
SUPREME COURT JUSTICES (1982); MICHAEL E. PARRISH, FELIX FRANKFURTER AND His TIMES: THE REFORM
YEARS (1982); JAMES F. SIMON, THE ANTAGONISTS: HUGO BLACK, FELIX FRANKFURTER AND CIVI LInER-
TIES IN MODERN AMERICA (1989); HELEN SHIRLEY THOMAS, FELIX FRANKFURTER: SCHOLAR ON THE BENCH
(1960); Michael E. Parrish, Felix Frankfurter, The Progressive Tradition, and the Warren Court, in THE
WARREN COURT IN HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVE, supra note 10, at 51-63, 174-77; Michael E.
Parrish, Felix Frankfurter, in THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, supra note 16, at 171-81; Michael E. Parrish,
Justice Felix Frankfurter and the Supreme Court, in THE JEWISH JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT REVISrr-
ED: BRANDEIS TO FORTAS 61-80 (Jennifer M. Lowe ed., 1994) (special edition of J. SuP. Cr. HIST.). See also
THE CONSTITUTIONAL WORLD OF MR. JUSTICE FRANKFURTER: SOME REPRESENTATIVE OPINIONS (Samuel J.
Konefsky ed., 1949); F X FRANKFURTER ON THE SUPREME COURT. EXTRAJUDICIAL ESSAYS ON THE COURT
AND THE CONSTITUTION (Philip B. Kurland ed., 1970); ROOSEVELT AND FRANKFURTER: THEIR CORRESPON-
DENCE 1928-1945 (Max Freedman ed., 1967); HOLMES AND FRANKFURTER: THEIR CORRESPONDENCE, 1912-
1934 (Robert M. Mennel & Christine L. Compston eds., 1996); Felix Frankftrter An Intimate Portrait An
Exhibition at the Harvard Law School 7 September to 31 December 1982 Honoring Felix Frankfurter on the
Centennial of His Birth (prepared by Erika Chadbourn, 1982); A Passionate Intensity: Felix Frankfurter: Pub-
lic Servant, Teacher, Jurist, Colleague: A Retrospective Exhibit at the Harvard Law School, September 6,
1977-February 6, 1978 (prepared by Erika S. Chadboum, 1977); Felix Frankfurter: An Inventory of His Pa-
pers in the Harvard Law School Library (compiled by Erika S. Chadbourn, 1982); Felix Frankfurter: A Regis-
ter of His Papers in the Library of Congress (Manuscript Division, rev. ed., 1984). See also supra note 233
(references); infra note 266 (references on Frankfurter's role in Brown).
260. Dorsen, supra note 24, at 248. See also Moglen, supra note 34, at 966 (arguing that Frankfurter's
"career on the Supreme Court... was in many respects a failure" especially "the failure to become the domi-
nant presence on the Court in his time") (emphasis added); UROFSKY, FELIX FRANKFURTER, supra note 19
(same); Melvin I. Urofsky, The Failure of Felix Frankfurter, 26 U. RICH. L. REV. 175 (1991). But see text
accompanying infra note 266 (Frankfurter revival or revisionism).
261. Schwartz, supra note 22, at 258. See also Mark B. Rotenberg, Politics, Personality and Judging: The
Lessons of Brandeis and Frankfurter on Judicial Restraint, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1863 (1983) (reviewing MUR-
PHY, supra note 259 & HIRSCH, supra note 15) ("Felix Frankfurter stands [in 1983], perhaps more than any
other judge past or present, as an easy target for criticism.").
262. See supra note 15.
263. Kurland, supra note 24, at 225.
264. See also Feldman, supra note 72 (some faint praise for Frankfurter, but ultimately Warren receives
the praise for "a crucial role" in Brown).
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tional role of the judiciary in [American] democracy often condoned re-
sults distasteful to... The Liberal Creed ....
[Frankfurter] was concerned with the proper means for resolving issues in
a constitutional democracy, whereas [most Warren Court justices] were
primarily concerned with getting the right answers to those issues, how-
ever secured. Frankfurter... thought that the doctrine that the ends justi-
fied the means was pernicious .... [H]e had doubts beyond the theoreti-
cal that [Justices] fulfilled the qualifications for Platonic guardians. Cer-
tainly... their method of selection did not assure that they were so quali-
fied.
Some, but not most Retrospective contributors, may have glimpsed, for Warren
Court aficionados, the future.
[Frankfurter] is widely regarded [in 1994] ... as a "tragic" figure ....
Stl... Frankfurter (even if he was an impossible person) deserves a
biographer who doesn't regard Black and Douglas as... unambiguous
heroes .... Frankfurter had at least an arguable claim to impressive con-
sistency over time, opposing individual rights claims with which he had
political sympathy not only when political conservatives dominated the
Court... but also when political liberals did. From the perspective of the
1990s, when judicial activism is as likely to mean judicial invalidation of
affirmative action (Croson), campaign finance reform legislation (Buckley
v. Valeo), hate speech regulations (R.A.V.), or restrictive environmental
legislation (Lucas) as it is to mean invalidation of abortion restrictions or
school prayer, one wonders if the time has not arrived to begin contem-
plating a revisionist rehabilitation of Frankfurter."e
265. Kurland, supra note 24, at 225, 228, 229. See also McManamon, supra note 233, at 701 (suggesting
that Frankfurter "was much more of a success that we currently realize" and providing three reasons why
characterization of Frankfurter as a failure is wrong); Alfred S. Neely, Mr. Justice Frankfurter's Iconography
of Judging, 82 KY. LJ. 535, 573 (1993) (concluding that Frankfurter has "bested the best of his critics" in
achieving "judicial restraint accompanied by proper disinterest"); Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Interpretation,
Character, and Experience, 72 B.U. L. REV. 747, 758 (1992) (concluding that "Frankfurter was not an apostle
of judicial restraint" and that "Frankfurter's true successors were people like Earl Warren and Thurgood Mar-
shall").
266. Michael J. Klarman, Book Review, 12 L. & HIST. REv. 399, 400, 407 (1994) (reviewing BALL &
COOPER, supra note 1; UROrSKY, FLix FRANKFURTER, supra note 19; YARBROUGH, supra note 234). This
raises a stark question: should supporters and advocates of Warren Court judicial activism now (even if they
can obtain five Supreme Court votes) switch to embracing Frankfurterian deference? Cf. supra note 240 (ex-
amples of allegiance switches). That is, should implementation of values be through democratic-legislative
and executive-processes? Should judicial activism be repudiated? See supra notes 70 (references on counter-
majoritarian conundrum), 223 (references on judicial activism and deference). Should the political question
doctrine be expanded? See generally MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPF-AcHmEN PROCESs: A CON-
STTUrEoNAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 118-46, 208-12 (1996) ("Judicial Review of Impeachments");
Rebecca L. Brown, When Political Questions Affect Individual Rights: The Other Nixon v. United States,
1993 Sup. Cr. REV. 125 (advocating abandonment of nonjusticiability doctrine); Michael J. Gerhardt, Redis-
covering Nonjusticiability: Judicial Review of Impeachments After Nixon, 44 DUKE LJ. 231 (1994); Louis
Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YAIE LJ. 597 (1976) (answer. No); Wayne
McCormack, The Political Question Doctrine-Jurisprudentially, 70 U. DEr. MERCY L. REV. 793 (1993); J.
Peter Mulhern, In Defense of the Political Question Doctrine, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 97 (1988); Robert F. Nagel,
Political Law, Legalistic Politics: A Recent History of the Political Question Doctrine, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
643 (1989); Linda S. Simard, Standing Alone: Do We Still Need the Political Question Doctrine?, 100 DICK.
L. REv. 303 (1996) (discussing relationship between standing and political question doctrine and concluding
that the latter should be abolished). Note that in Brown, Justice Jackson advocated judicial restraint, see supra
note 234, not Justice Frankfurter. On Frankfurter's role in Brown, see supra note 82 (references); Philip
Elman, The Solicitor General's Office, Justice Frankfurter, and Civil Rights Litigation, 1946-1960, 100 HARV.
[Vol. 32:843
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V. BROAD PERSPECTrIVES
No glimmer emerges from The Warren Court: A Retrospective of a prag-
matically important controversy: vis-a-vis their assumed beneficiaries, 7 was
the effect of 1953-1969 Supreme Court decisions and doctrines beneficial or
detrimental?' Oblivious to other possibilities, essays constituting "A
Broader Perspective""0 push in one-beneficial-direction. t Consequently, the
conclusion appears to be unavoidable: constitutional law promulgated by the
Warren Court was and has been, especially for African-Americans, the civil
rights movement, and criminal defendants, an unalloyed good. Indeed, by sub-
suming this conclusion into their premise, that the Justices were making con-
stitutional law for African-Americans, civil rights agitators, and criminals, con-
servative criticsm reinforced this conclusion's credibility.
Additionally, contextualized within and against broader parameters-cold
war,'D civil rights movement, and Vietnam war 4-- of nearly two decades of
American history, 5 the Supreme Court becomes a beacon of shimmering
light. Even "conservative" critics concede that
[a]ny criticism of the Warren Court-at least any honest and fair criti-
cism-must start with the acknowledgment that this was a truly great
Court, that many of its members were giants of [America's] modem ju-
L. REV. 817 (1987); Philip Elman, Response, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1949 (1987); Randall Kennedy, A Reply to
Philip E/man, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1938 (1987).
267. Sometimes these assumptions are wrong. For an example, see Thomson, Swimming in the Air, supra
note 6, at 192-93 n.299 (discussing different views of Muller v Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (holding consti-
tutional Oregon statute imposing maximum working day for women in factories and laundries)).
268. This is a complex (and evolving) debate involving empirical and normative aspects. See supra notes
1-2, 121-23.
269. Of course, THE WARREN COuRT. A RETROsPEctVE, supra note 11, refers to conservative criticism
of Warren Court decisions such as Miranda, see, e.g., id. at 119-21, as benefiting defendants, but hindering
law enforcement. See also supra notes 95-99, 185-89 (references to critics).
270. TE WARREN COURT. A RETROSPECTIVE, supra note 11, at 283-406.
271. Even critics such as Kozinski concede the Warren Court was beneficial. See, e.g., text accompanying
infra note 276. Kozinski concludes: "[The Warren Court] has ... forever changed the way we look at the sun
[of Justice]." Kozinski, supra note 25, at 385.
272. See supra note 269 (references to Warren Court's conservative critics and criticism).
273. See generally DAVID CARTER, THE GREAT FEAIL THE ANTi-CoMMUNIST PURGE UNDER TRUMAN
AND EISENHOWER (1978); WALTER GOODMAN, THE CoMMrErI THE EXTRAORD NARY CAREER OF THE
HOUSE COMMIrrEE ON UN-AMEriCAN AcnvrnEs (1968); STANLEY L KuTLER, THE AMERICAN INQUIsIoN:
JUSTICE AND INJUSTICE IN THE COLD WAR (1982). For some legal and constitutional perspectives, see, for
example, 1MIcHAL R. BEIxNAP, COLD WAR POLITAL JUSTnCm THE SMrrH Acr, THE COMMUNIST PARTY,
AND AMERICN CIwm LIEERTEs (1977); Michal R. Belknap, Cold War in the Court Room: The Foley Square
Communist Trial, in AMERICAN POLmCAL TRIALS 210 (Michal R. Belknap ed., rev. ed., 1994); Michal R.
Belknap, Dennis v. United States: Great Case or Cold War Relic?, 1993 J. SUP. Cr. HIST. 41.
274. See generally PHILum B. DAVDSON, VIETNAM AT WAR: THE HISTORY 1946-1975 (1988); JAMES
HERRING, AMERICA'S LONGEST WAR (1979). For some legal and constitutional aspects, see, for example,
JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSEaILITY: CONSTrritiONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH
(1993); Symposium, War and Responsibility: A Symposium on Congress, the President, and the Authority to
Initiate Hostilities, 50 U. MIA L. REV. 1 (1995).
275. See generally 2 ALFRED H. KELLY ET AL., THE AMERICAN CONSTIrtUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVEL-
OPMENT 553-677 (7th ed. 1991); JAMES T. PATTERSON, GRAND EXPECTATIONS: THE UNITED STATES, 1945-
1974 (1996); UROFSKY, A MARCH OF LIBERTY, supra note 19, at 746-853.
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risprudence. It was a Court imbued with vision and courage at a time in
[America's] history when vision and courage were scarce commodi-
ties.16
Supporters also promulgate this theme.
In an era in which political outsiders pressed their case with more energy
than ever before, the Warren Court responded. Doing so made it distinc-
tive in the history of the Court and for the first and only time the Justices
empathized with the social and political outsiders....
T he quest to enhance social and political rights was a uniquely judi-
cial and legal task, since the existing centers of political power were un-
likely, without some pressure, to change their behavior.'
But, was the resulting "change... [in] behavior," greater resistance by "centers
of political power" which, for example, stalled or impeded congressional civil
rights legislation?' As a matter of empirical and statistical evidence, did even
prominent cases, such as Brown27 9 and Miranda," advance or retard (either
contemporaneously or subsequently) actual factual situations-as opposed to the
276. Kozinski, supra note 25, at 377. Immediately, preceding this concession, Kozinski states: "for a
conservative like myself." Id. See also id. at 383 ("I have no trouble at all with Sullivan.... I think it's an
excellent example of the vigor with which judges and Justices should approach constitutional provisions that
protect individuals from government oppression.").
277. Hall, supra note 37, at 299-300.
278. See supra note 122 (Brown "served to deaden political debate"). For attacks, on Brown and the Su-
preme Court, which stalled or impeded civil rights legislation, see supra notes 79, 81. See also JACK BASS,
UNLIKELY HEROES: THE DRAMATIC STORY OF THE SOUTHERN JUDGES OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT WHO TRANS-
LATED THE SUPREME COURT'S BROWN DECISION INTO A REVOLUTION FOR EQUALITY (1981); JACK BASS,
TAMNG Tm STORM: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF JUDGE FRANK M. JOHNSON, JR., AND THE SOUTH'S FGHT
OVER CIVIL RiGHs (1993); E. CULPEPPER CLARK, THE SCHOOLHOUSE DOOR: SEGREGATION'S LAST STAND
AT THE UNIVERSrrY OF ALABAMA (1993); TONY FREYER, THE LnrmE RocK CISIS: A CONSTITUTIONAL
INTERRETATION (1984). More generally, see supra note 213 (civil rights movement). Eventually, Brown con-
tributed (albeit indirectly) to congressional civil rights legislation. This is the "backlash" thesis:
[A]n alternative account of Brown's indirect contribution to racial change ... focuses on the backlash
against Brown. In this view, Brown was indirectly responsible for the transformative civil rights legis-
lation of the mid-1960s by setting in motion... [a] pattern of events. Brown crystallized southern
resistance to racial change .... [This] unification of southern racial intransigence... temporarily
destroyed southern racial moderation ... [and] catapulted into public office.., massive resistance
politicians ... [who] brutal[ly] suppress[ed] ... civil rights demonstrations. There followed national-
ly televised scenes of... [this brutality] which converted millions of previously indifferent northern
whites into enthusiastic proponents of civil rights legislation.
... Many ... [scholars] have copiously documented the racial fanaticism that Brown induced in
southern politics. Other scholars... have convincingly demonstrated the connection between sup-
pression of civil rights demonstrations at Birmingham and Selma, Alabama, and the enactment of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 .... [N]obody has assembled these
links into a causal chain that connects Brown, in an indirect and indeed almost perverse manner, with
the landmark civil rights legislation of the mid-1960s.
Klarman, How Brown Changed Race Relations, supra note 1, at 81-82. Cf. supra notes 122-23 (postulating
different Brown effects). See also Symposium, Twentieth-Century Constitutional History, 80 VA. L. REV. 1, 7-
199 (1994) (Klarman article and commentaries by Garrow, Rosenberg, Tushnet, and Klarman on Brown's
impact and significance).
279. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See supra note 82 (references).
280. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). See supra note 84 (references).
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theoretical possession and expansion of constitutional rights-of individual
African-Americans or criminal defendants? 2s
Already, support for a retardation conclusion has emerged." Without
rushing to pragmatic extremities,' this should encourage the abandonment of
shibboleths.0 4 Consequently, more realistic assessments, not devoid of impor-
tant intangible-emotions, feelings, and psychology-characteristics, can be
eagerly anticipated. If initial indications are confirmed, a radical shift in as-
sessments of the Warren Court-from beneficial advancement to retrogressive
retardation-may emerge.
VI. CONCLUSION
Of course, as A Retrospective perhaps unintentionally suggests, more time
is required. Its contributors' biographical resumes supplies an obvious reason:
objectivity ' is not necessarily enhanced and may be diminished by scholarly
reminiscences of those who lived through and closely participated in the Warren
281. For negative responses, see, for example, ROSENBERG, supra note 1; Seidman, supra note 1. For
negative short-term, but positive (even if indirect) long-term, responses on Brown's effect, see Klarman, supra
note 1. See also supra note 122-23 (quotations). Of course, if Miranda has been eroded, see supra note 195,
only contemporaneous evaluations are relevant.
282. See supra notes 122, 278.
283. See, e.g., WILLIAM TWING, KARL LLEwELLYN AND THE REAIUST MOVEMENT 60-67 (1973) (dis-
cussing 1930s-1950s "empirical research" including Underhill Moore's "twenty years ... of applying scientif-
ic method to the empirical study of law," for example, his "parking studies ... considered by many to be the
reductio ad absurdum of 'scientism'"); John Henry Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social
Science: From the Yale Experience, 28 BUFF. L. REv. 459 (1979); Christopher Shannon, The Dance of Histo-
ry, 8 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 495, 497-502 (1996) (reviewing JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL RE-
ALISM AND EMPIRICAL SOCIAL ScIENCE (1995)) (describing empirical and statistical projects undertaken by
legal realists such as Underhill Moore and Walter Wheeler Cook). For subsequent, less empirical, pragmatism,
see, for example, PRAGMAISM IN LAW AND SOCmTY (Michael Brint & William Weaver eds., 1991); Steven
D. Smith, In Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE LJ. 409 (1990); Symposium on the Renaissance of Pragma-
tism in American Legal Thought, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1569-1853, 1911-28 (1990). See also David M. Trubeck,
Where the Action Is: Critical Legal Studies and Empiricism, 36 STAN. L. REV. 575 (1984) (more sophisticated
understanding, than early legal empiricists, of empirical research's nature and power). Compare the controver-
sy generated by footnote 11 in Brown, 347 U.S. 483, 494 n.ll (1954). See, e.g., GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAw 653-54 (12th ed. 1991) (explanation and references); David L. Faigman, "Normative Constitu-
tional Fact-Finding": Exploring the Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L.
REV. 541, 565-72 (1991) (discussing footnote 11); Herbert Hovenkamp, Social Science and Segregation Be-
fore Brown, 1985 DUKE LJ. 624, 664 n.226 (references).
284. See, e.g., TiE WARREN COURT. A RETROSPECTIVE, supra note 11, at i ("the [Warren] Court that so
transformed the law and the society"); id. at 406 ("judicial heroism").
285. See, e.g., id. at 277 (Warren "was my hero"); id. at 399 (when Warren "began reading portions of
his opinion" in Reynolds v. Sims, "it felt [like] be[ing] present at the Second American Constitutional Conven-
tion [which] reflected the awe that all of us in [the Supreme Court] felt at what was happening"). See also
Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 ("A sense of inferiority affects the motivation of d child to learn" and reference to
"psychological knowledge").
286. See supra notes 278-81 (possibility that Warren Court decisions harmed Court's intended beneficia-
ries).
287. See generally RICHARD J. BERNSEMIN, BEYOND OBJEcrIVISM AND RELATIVISM: SCIENCE,
HRMENEMRTcs, AND PRAMS (1983) (discussing dichotomy between objectivism and relativism and their re-
placement with historically situated contingency); Joan C. Williams, Critical Legal Studies: The Death of
Transcendence and the Rise of the New Langdells, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 429, 430 (1987) (exploring
"[t]raditional epistemology, with its belief in the existence of transcendent, objective truth" and the "new"
more culturally contingent epistemology). See also KENT GREENAWALT, LAW AND OBJECTIVY (1992) (ex-
amining whether the law is or should be objective).
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Court revolution. Even without invoking general historical scholarship,"8 Su-
preme Court historiography exemplifies the continuous revisionism which inev-
itably occurs.ss Indeed, Warren Court history has already encountered ripples,
if not waves, of revisionism.'e Given this milieu, as the title recognizes, The
Warren Court: A Retrospective pushes backwards, not forward.
Is receding enthusiasm for the Warren Court, therefore, a pre-ordained
result? If so, it is not displayed in The Warren Court: A Retrospective. Thus,
there remain prospects of future Warren Court celebrations. Rather than regret,
this can confer benefits. One is the enticement of different and opposing per-
spectives. Then, in the best traditions of American legal literature, the past will
capture the future.
288. "Revising interpretations of the past is intrinsic to the study of history." ERIc FONER, RECONSTRUC-
lION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-1877, at xix (1988). A prime example is Reconstruction
historiography. See, e.g., id. at xix-xxvii (summarizing constant revisionism); Eric Foner, Reconstruction Re-
visited, 10 REV. AM. Hism. 82 (1982).
289. See, e.g., Moglen, supra note 8, at 2027-29 (placing Fiss' history of the 1888-1910 Supreme Court
"in the new scholarly synthesis" and contrasting "the pre-World War H institutionalists" with "a new vision of
the role of the [Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court which] ... depart[s] fundamentally from the
pattern of exhaustive institutional description and adopt[s] a self-consciously revisionist interpretative pos-
ture'). See also supra note 8 (references).
290. See, e.g., Hall, supra note 37, at 294 (adumbrating "[t]hree schools of revisionist scholarship [which]
have sharply challenged [the traditional] liberal-instrumentalist view [of the Warren Court]").
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